Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Duties of the SSO Palace SecurityThe Directorate of Security Affairs oversaw the securitydetails within the presidential palaces and facilitiesof the Iraqi Regime. While the Special RepublicanGuard (SRG) maintained the perimeter and mainentrance gate security, the Directorate of SecurityAffairs provided close-protection internal securitymeasures:• Access control for incoming and outgoing palacevisitors, to include verifying authorizations, securitybadges, personal and vehicular searches.• Verifying personnel records for all inside andoutside palace workers with the assistance of theDirectorate of General Security (DGS).• Escorting or monitoring all workers (janitors, waiters,contractors, etc.) in the presidential palaces.• Requesting and validating annual security clearancesfrom the Directorate of General Security forall enlisted and commissioned SRG personnel.by the other soldiers. In the event of disloyalty ora security breach, the security officer would reportthe event directly to the director of RG Security. Forexample, a security officer at the battalion level wouldnot be required to pass the information through thebrigade and division security offices. The Director ofRG Security could bypass the SSO Director becauseof his special link with Qusay.The Directorate of CommunicationsSecure communications between strategic Regimefacilities was the responsibility of the Directorate ofCommunications, directed by Head Engineer Safa’Shakir Taha. This directorate established and maintainedlandline and wireless communications for allpalaces, directorates, presidential and Diwan offices,and Republican Guard headquarters. Two departmentswithin the directorate specialized in wirelessand landline communications systems. The LandlineDepartment was headed by Engineer Salam ‘Aziz; theWireless Department was headed by Engineer ‘Abdal-Rahman.The SSO Security BranchSimilar in mission to the RG Security Directorate ora police department’s Internal Affairs division, theSSO Security Branch monitored the personnel of theSpecial Security Organization. A cousin of Qusay,Fatik Karim Sulayman Al Majid, was the last knowndirector of this branch. Fatik had almost constantaccess to Saddam, because the SSO Security Branchwas Saddam’s window into Qusay’s inner circle.Saddam appointed strong loyalists, all of whom weremembers of his personal guard staff, to each of thesecurity and intelligence services near the beginningof 2001. All of these positions reported the activitiesof their various agencies to Fatik, Director ofthe SSO Security Branch. Khalid Najim ‘AbdallahSultan Al Majid Al Tikriti was appointed to head theIIS Security Branch (M6), Haytham Sulayman AlMajid was appointed to head the Security Branch forthe Directorate of General Military Intelligence, andSalim ‘Abd-al-Qatar Sulayman was appointed to headthe respective security element of the Directorate ofGeneral Security.Cross-checking of the various services placed theSSO in a superior position over these agencies. Forexample, the IIS was not informed of SSO operations,but the SSO would be informed of all IIS operations;only the liaison officers between the two organizationswould communicate officially. If the IIS becameaware of a Ba’th Party member plotting action againstthe Regime, the case would be passed directly tothe SSO. However, if the IIS wished to keep a case,Saddam most likely would have been consulted.The Surveillance and Information BranchThe Surveillance and Information Branch was taskedwith monitoring Iraqi officials, all employees withinthe office of the presidency, and other designatedtargets, to identify individuals of questionable loyalty.The director of this branch, Rafi’ Hamid MuhammadAl Sagmani, oversaw the operations of two sub-sections,the Telecommunications Monitoring Section,headed by Muhammad Ra’uf Ghassub, and theHuman Surveillance Section, headed by Harith AlDuri. Rafi’ was another of Qusay’s close associateswithin the SSO.90