Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

IAEC—MIC Cooperation for the Procurement ofCNC MachinesBased on interviews with Fadil Al Janabi, formerhead of the IAEC, and ‘Abd-al-Tawab Al MullahHuwaysh, former Minister of Military Industrialization,it is evident that the MIC procured CNCmachines for the IAEC as part of a “special project”for modernizing Iraq’s scientifi c infrastructure in2001.• According to interviews with Fadil Al Janabi, presidentialsecretary ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud Al KhatabAl Nasiri was approached in 2001with a proposalfor a modernization program that included procurementof new machinery and equipment, enablingthe IAEC to create molds and manufacture specialtyparts in-house. Al Janabi wanted to procurethese CNC machines through the MIC to bypassforeign supplier’s reluctance to sell manufacturingequipment to the IAEC.• Huwaysh recalled that in 2001, Al Janabi andKhalid Ibrahim Sa’aid contacted him with apresidential order to assist the IAEC with a “specialproject.” The MIC was not to be involved withestablishing technical specifi cations or providingfunding, but was to serve as a functional link.• During this initial meeting, which was alsoattended by Munir Al Kubaysi, Director Generalof MIC’s Al-Basha’ir Company, Huwaysh claimedhe was informed that he did not need to know whatwas being procured. He further remembered therelative high cost of the machines, costing approximatelyhalf the budget of the entire special IAECmodernization project.• A source with access stated that the most precisemachines were capable of 5-micron accuracy, butnone of the machines were fi ve to six axes becausethis would have “broken sanctions and all of themachines were declared to inspectors.” The IAECemployee stated that these high-precision machineswere installed at Tuwaitha and information regardingthese machines was provided to the UN andIAEA in the declaration given in December 2002.• ISG has found Iraqi documents that corroboratethis assertion, showing that the IAEC had preparedUN forms (OMV Form 22.5/ MOD.2) for eight CNCmachines, all of which were identifi ed as three-axesmachines. The descriptions in the declarations areconsistent with the statements of the mid-level managers.It is important to note, however, that these IAECsources referred to the MIC manufacturing companyAl Badr and not Al-Basha’ir, the MIC front companyinvolved in negotiations with Huwaysh. In the interchangebetween the IAEC and the MIC, Al Janabiwas explicitly ordered that all transactions andcommunications on this procurement project wereto go through Munir Al Kubaysi and Al-Basha’ir.ISG judges it is probable that this “special project”procurement was carried out by Al-Basha’ir asa separate classified channel for IAEC precisionmachinery. This assessment supports Huwaysh’sclaim of the sensitivity surrounding the “classifi ed”nature of the IAEC modernization project in 2001.IAEC scientists and employees, in contrast, haveclaimed that CNC machines procured from Taiwanwere not high precision and were the same as thoseused at the Al Badr General Company.Mi-17 helicopters; spares and repairs for MiG-23, -25and -29 plus Sukhoi 25 jets; laser guidance systems;fiber optics; infrared spare parts; GPS jammers; andradios.Even during the prelude to OIF, the illicit Belarusianmilitary trade with Iraq did not stop as shown by captureddocuments. Belarus provided PN-5 and PN-7night-vision devices for Iraq through the Al-Basha’irfront company. Three months before the onset of the128