Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

VX Warhead Samples & The Iraqi Air ForceDocument StoryTwo events in mid-1998 defi ned a turning point inUNSCOM/Iraq relations: The detection of VX-relatedcompounds on ballistic missile warhead fragmentsand the discovery of a document describing the use ofspecial weapons by the Iraqi Air Force. Both eventsconvinced inspectors that their assessment of ongoingIraqi concealment was correct. Conversely, thediscoveries convinced Iraqi authorities of the futilityof continued cooperation.“You overlook many truths from a liar.”—’AmirAl Sa’adi in reference to an old Arabic proverbIn order to verify Iraqi declarations and specialweapons accounting, wipe samples of ballistic missilewarhead remnants were taken by an UNSCOMsampling mission in April 1997. These samples wereanalyzed by laboratories designated by the SpecialCommission, which detected the presence of degradationproducts of nerve agents, in particular VX, ona number of warhead remnants. In addition to thesechemicals, a VX stabilizer and its degradation productwere identified in some of the samples. A secondround of sample testing was conducted by the UnitedStates in February 1998, confirming the previousfi ndings. However, subsequent analysis performed byFrench and Swiss labs was been inconclusive.In June 1998, in multiple statements, including fromIraq’s Foreign Minister and Permanent Representativeto the UN, Iraq categorically denied the outcomeof the testing and argued that the results could nothave been accurate since VX was not used in any kindof munitions in Iraq due to continuous productionfailure. According to the former the Minister of MilitaryIndustrialization, the Iraqi leadership viewed thisepisode as one more example of collusion betweenthe US and UNSCOM to discredit Iraqi complianceefforts and lengthen sanctions.UNSCOM submitted a report to the Security Council,which stated that the existence of VX degradationproducts conflicted with Iraq’s declarations that theunilaterally destroyed special warheads had neverbeen fi lled with any CW agents.In response, Iraq claimed that the contaminationof the warhead fragments had been the result of adeliberate act of tampering with samples taken tothe United States. In public statements following anAugust 1998 announcement of Iraq’s suspension ofcooperation with UNSCOM, Tariq ‘Aziz denied Iraqhad any weapons of mass destruction and accusedUNSCOM of catering to hostile American policy byprolonging the inspection process. Said ‘Aziz, “themanner in which the inspection teams have actedrecently is neither honest nor fast. This policy servesthe United States. I have had . . . the impression thatUNSCOM is back to its old games and tricks.” AlSa’adi saw the VX issue as the critical catalyst infeeding Iraqi distrust of UNSCOM and convincingIraqi officials that no matter what they did, it wouldnever be enough to achieve sanctions relief. Hesummed up the matter by stating, “We lost faith withUNSCOM after VX; we determined they were after usby hook or crook.”On 18 July 1998, another incident created a confrontationbetween UNSCOM and Iraqi officials.During an inspection of the operations room atIraqi Air Force Headquarters, an UNSCOM teamfound a document containing information about theconsumption of special (chemical) munitions duringthe Iran-Iraq War.According to Husam Muhammad Amin, former directorof the National Monitoring Directorate, “It waslaziness on behalf of the Brigadier that the documentwas found. The Brigadier had more than one hour tohide the document while the inspectors waited at theentrance of the Air Force command. The Brigadierwas sent to court and his judgment was imprisonmentfor 5-10 years in jail.”The inspection team felt that this document could behelpful in their efforts to verify the material balanceof Iraq’s chemical munitions. Rather than take possessionof the document, the chief inspector on theteam requested a copy. Initially Iraqi offi cials on thescene agreed; then reneged, saying inspectors couldonly take notes on the document or receive a redacted54