Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Who Made Iraq’s StrategicDecisions and Determined WMDPolicySaddam’s Place in the RegimeThe Apex of PowerSaddam controlled every peak position of authorityin Iraq and formally dominated its state, administrative,Ba’th party and military hierarchies. Bythe time of Desert Storm, there was no constitutionalthreat to his position of authority. He had alsoappointed himself “Paramount Sheikh” in a bid todominate the country’s tribal system. By the late1990s, he began seeking more formal control over thenation’s religious structures.• Saddam was simultaneously President, PrimeMinister, Chairman of the Revolutionary CommandCouncil (RCC), General Secretary of theBa’th Party, and Commander in Chief of the ArmedForces. Also directly reporting to him were theRepublican Guard (RG), Special Republican Guard(SRG), Fedayeen Saddam, the four intelligenceagencies, the Military Industrialization Commission(MIC) a and the Al Quds Army.• Tariq ‘Aziz says that Saddam had enhanced the roleof the tribal leaders, giving them money, weapons,land and authority, to turn them into an instrumentof support for himself.but share his thoughts with few advisors. He wascool under pressure. Even his firmest supporters,such as ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab AlNasiri, the former presidential secretary from 1991to 2003, characterize his decision-making style assecretive.• ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh—former Deputy Prime Minister from 2001 to 2003and Minister of Military Industrialization from1997 to 2003—believed there was a “big gap”between Saddam and his advisors and that, despitethe lengthy pondering of an issue, he could be emotiveat the point of decision. For example, Huwaysh,while not in a position of power at the time, pointedto the sudden and unconsultative manner in whichSaddam ordered the invasion of Kuwait, despite theamount of planning and forethought that had goneinto the scheme.• Saddam had shown a detailed, technical interest inmilitary affairs during the Iran-Iraq war, frequentlyvisiting army units and giving direct instructions,whether or not the defense minister or the chief-ofstaffwas present. In contrast, limited evidence suggeststhat after 1991 Saddam attempted to detachhimself from the minutiae of working with the UN.• Nevertheless, Saddam was prone to take personalcontrol of projects that spanned military industry,higher education, electricity, and air defense,according to former Presidential Advisor ‘Ali HasanAl Majid.Regime StrategicIntentPersonalized RuleSaddam dominated all Iraqi institutions by the early1990s and increasingly administered by personaldirection. Major strategic decisions were made bySaddam’s fiat alone, although subordinates actedupon what they perceived to be indirect or impliedorders from him. Moreover, Saddam, particularlyearly in his rule, was fond of micromanagement in allaspects of government.• Former advisors suggest that Saddam was healthy,rational and deliberate. He would ponder key decisions—suchas the invasion of Kuwait—for monthsa As a convention, “Military Industrialization Commission” is usedthroughout this text to refer to the Arabic Name Hi’at al-TasniaAl-‘Askarri. Other translations of the name include Organizationof Military Industrialization (OMI) and Military Industrial Organization(MIO). All refer to the same institution.Saddam’s Unsettled LieutenantsMost of Saddam’s key lieutenants were active,experienced and committed to the Regime, but bythe mid-1990s they were tightly constrained by theirfear of Saddam, isolation and a loss of power. Manyaccepted the limits of their personal influence inreturn for membership in a privileged class, becauseof a personal identification with the goals of theRegime and realization of the personal consequencesshould it fall.5