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Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

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Annex JThe Procurement of ConventionalMilitary Goods in Breach of UNSanctionsBefore the 1991 Gulf war, <strong>Iraq</strong> indigenously producedammunition, small arms, gun barrels, and otherbasic military items. The war, however, destroyed<strong>Iraq</strong>’s military industrial base leaving Saddam’sRegime with critical shortages of military spare parts,ammunition, and other materiel. United NationsSecurity Council Resolution (UNSCR) 661 frustratedSaddam’s attempts to reconstitute his military capacityfollowing Desert Storm, because UNSCR 661prohibited UN members from exporting conventionalmilitary goods and related technologies to <strong>Iraq</strong>.Many individuals, foreign companies, and somecountries knowingly violated UN sanctions. In somecases, governments failed to comply with or enforcesanctions out of recalcitrance of internationalnorms or inability or negligence to monitor the commercialactivities of certain individuals and firmswilling to conduct illicit business with Saddam’sRegime. Governments not only included UN members,but also permanent members of the UNSC.<strong>Iraq</strong>i efforts to obtain military goods and related technologiesin the mid-1990s until OIF in March 2003can be divided into several categories: raw materials;consumables; and military goods. <strong>Iraq</strong> sought materialssuch as steel, aluminum and titanium to supply itsmilitary manufacturing industry. Under Saddam, <strong>Iraq</strong>constantly needed spare parts for manufacturing andfor military equipment. As with any military organization,the <strong>Iraq</strong>i military always required consumablessuch as batteries, tires, and ammunition. We judgethat <strong>Iraq</strong>’s most pressing requirement, however, wasfor military equipment.• For potential suppliers, the sale of military equipmentoffered the strongest profit margins.• Since the beginning of sanctions in 1990, Saddamsuccessfully acquired a wide range of militarygoods or their component parts for SAM systems,main battle tanks, anti-tank guided missiles(ATGM), combat aircraft, GPS jammers, and nightvisionequipment.The United Nations Sanctions on <strong>Iraq</strong>The UNSC passed numerous resolutions from 1990to 2003 prohibiting member states to export, militarygoods and technology to Saddam’s Regime, placingfi nancial constraints on UN members conductingbusiness with <strong>Iraq</strong>, establishing WMD and militaryrestrictions on <strong>Iraq</strong>, and the formulation and implementationof the UN OFF program. UNSC passedtwo UNSCR, 661 (1990) and 687 (1991) that specificallyprohibited the export of military goods to <strong>Iraq</strong>by UN members. Paragraph 24 of UNSCR 687 reads:In accordance with UNSCR 661 and subsequentrelated resolutions and until a further decision istaken by the Security Council, all States shall continueto prevent the sale or supply or promotion orfacilitation of such sale or supply, to <strong>Iraq</strong> by theirnationals or from their territories or using their fl agvessel or aircraft, of; arms and related material ofall types, specifi cally including the sale or transferthrough other means of all forms of conventionalmilitary equipment including paramilitary forcesand spare parts and components and their means ofproduction for such equipment.These restrictions included prohibitions on thelicensing of military technology and other transferarrangements used in the production, utilization, orstockpiling of military items. These UNSCR also prohibitedthe use of personnel or materials for trainingor technical support services relating to the design,development, manufacture, use, maintenance, or supportof military goods.• Throughout this investigation, ISG has exploitedinformation from captured documents from various<strong>Iraq</strong>i ministries and agencies and debriefings ofboth detainees and willing sources from the former<strong>Iraq</strong>i Regime. Examples found by ISG, providedbelow, represent only a small cross section of thetotal illicit dealings with <strong>Iraq</strong>. However, a fullinvestigation of all violations of UNSCR vis-à-vis<strong>Iraq</strong> is outside the scope of ISG’s investigation.Regime Financeand Procurement267

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