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Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

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How Saddam Saw HisSubordinatesMining Respect and ExpertiseSaddam recognized and respected talent and publicesteem in individual subordinates and area experts,but not to the point where they could contradict hisgoals, power or his judgment. He worked systematicallyto extract what they could contribute to theRegime, while keeping them politically isolated.Saddam was careful to keep subordinates from gainingpopularity.• According to ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid, “If some personmakes good work and gets the admiration of . . . theBa’thists, he does not keep that person . . . he neverlet an official admired by the <strong>Iraq</strong>is [stay] in thesame position for more than three years.”• ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh wassacked as Minister of Industry in 1988 after a clashwith Husayn Kamil and was ostracized for nineyears. He believed he only avoided prison becauseof Ramadan’s intervention with Saddam. Accordingto Huwaysh, no minister ever argued in meetingsagainst Saddam’s stated position because it “ . . .was unforgivable. It would be suicide.”• ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid said he feared Saddam andcited the killing of many people close to Saddam asthe basis of his fear.• Huwaysh said Saddam “loved the use of force.”• Fear worked both ways. At Saddam’s “one-on-one”weekly meetings with individual heads of securityagencies, he would always be accompanied by abodyguard, according to Hamid Yusif Hammadi,Minister of Culture and Information. “Saddam didnot trust anyone, even his cousin.”Regime StrategicIntentMutuality of FearSaddam feared that his subordinates could gatherenough strength to challenge his position, or even aparticular policy, and he acted to prevent it. He wasroutinely suspicious of subordinates—even those withlong standing loyalty. His subordinates remained fearfulof him, and they were incapable of common actionagainst him or key policies.• Tariq ‘Aziz said that he opposed the invasion ofKuwait, but could not dissuade Saddam. Asked whyhe did not resign in protest, he denied he thought hewould be killed, but said, “ . . . there would be noincome, no job.” Tariq ‘Aziz denied Saddam killedanyone personally while President. “But he wouldtell the security services to take care of things [dissenters],and they would take care of it.”• Ramadan believed that from late 2002, <strong>Iraq</strong>i policytoward the UN and the United States was takingthe Regime toward a disastrous war, but he said,“I couldn’t convince Saddam that an attack wascoming. I didn’t try that hard. He was monitoringmy performance in managing [UN] inspectors.”• Nevertheless, Saddam said he believed “Good personalrelations bring out the best in people.”Dazzled by ScienceSaddam was awed by science and inspired by thepossibilities it offered for national developmentand military power. Saddam had an enthusiasticattitude toward science dating back to when, in theearly 1970s, he found himself in charge of the <strong>Iraq</strong>iAtomic Energy Commission (IAEC) as part of hisresponsibilities as Vice President. Saddam venerated<strong>Iraq</strong>’s history as a center of scientific achievementunder individuals like the famous mathematician andastronomer Ibn Al Haytham (c. 965 AD—c. 1040AD). He retained a respect for many aspects of scienceto the end, but became less interested in detailand more detached from developments in <strong>Iraq</strong>’s scientificinfrastructure.• Deputy Prime Minister ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah AlMullah Huwaysh believed Saddam had “a specialaffection for his nuclear scientists” from the inceptionof the <strong>Iraq</strong>i nuclear program in the 1970s.19

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