Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Husayn KamilBorn in 1955 within the Al Majid branch of Saddam’sfamily, Husayn Kamil was the son of Saddam’s firstcousin on his father’s side, Kamil Hasan Al Majid‘Abd-al-Qadir. More importantly, Husayn Kamilbecame Saddam’s son-in-law, married in 1983 toSaddam’s eldest and favorite daughter, Raghad.Husayn Kamil began his rise to power within theRegime’s security services as part of Saddam’spersonal detail. According to Tariq ‘Aziz, HusaynKamil was a second lieutenant when Saddam becamepresident in July 1979.In 1983, Saddam appointed him Director of the SSOand later Supervisor, or “Overseer”(Mushrif), of theRG (including the SRG). In effect, he controlled all ofSaddam’s security organizations, an unprecedentedlevel of trust for any single individual. In 1987,Saddam appointed Husayn Kamil as Overseer of MilitaryIndustrialization. He rose to Minister of Industryand Military Industrialization (MIMI) in 1988 afteracquiring the Ministries of Heavy Industry and LightIndustry as well as exerting control over the Ministryof Petroleum, the Atomic Energy Commission, andPetrochemical Complex 3 (Iraq’s clandestine nuclearprogram). By 1990, Husayn Kamil was, very likely,the second most powerful man in Iraq.Husayn Kamil received broad administrative andfi nancial authority from Saddam to consolidate bothIraq’s research and development programs, and itsindustrial resources into military production, includingWMD and missile delivery systems production.Although not technically trained, Kamil oversawIraq’s program to modify the Regime’s Scud missilesto the longer-range Al Husayn variant, and the developmentand production of nerve agents, includingTabun, Sarin and VX.His relationship with Saddam gave Husayn Kamilopportunities to act outside the law and with minimalpersonal and fi scal oversight. Because of his familyties and proximity to Saddam, he could have anyonefi red or placed under suspicion. Although ‘AmirHamudi Hasan Al Sa’adi was the Deputy Directorof MIC and a key subordinate, Kamil did not relyon deputies. A former subordinate noted: “HusaynKamil did not have a right-hand man, as he was tooarrogant.” His successor at MIC, who was also oneof Kamil’s former subordinates said, “No one in MICcould control him and everyone feared him.”Saddam Husayn’s family(top)—Husayn Kamil on farleft; Kamil in uniform (left).By 1995 the impact of sanctions meant Iraq was onthe verge of bankruptcy—Kamil’s capricious and selfservingoversight of MIC, his lack of accountability,and the intrusive nature of UN inspections combinedto erode Iraq’s military industrial capability. HusaynKamil, his brother Saddam Kamil, and their wivesand children (Saddam Husayn’s grandchildren) fl edIraq and sought political asylum in Jordan on 9August 1995.Various reasons may explain why Husayn Kamil leftIraq. The most important reason may have been thegrowing tension between him and his bitter familyrival‘Uday Saddam Husayn. According to KingHussein of Jordan, “as far as we know, this was afamily crisis, in the personal context, for a fairly longperiod.” A further explanation revolves around theterrible state of the Iraqi economy under sanctionsand the possibility that he wanted to escape Iraqbefore a popular or tribal revolt unseated Saddamand his family. For his part, Husyan Kamil said Saddam’srule had “lost its creditability on the internationaland Arab level,” and that his defection “showsto what extent the situation in Iraq has deteriorated.”The Iraqi media and leadership fi rst accused him offi nancial improprieties, and then said he was “nomore than an employee in this state and his responsibilitieswere limited.” Finally, they made him theultimate “fall guy” for all Iraq’s problems—from theRegime’s decision to invade Kuwait, to Iraq’s duplicitousrelations with UNSCOM.Despite the level of invective on both sides, HusaynKamil, Saddam Kamil, and their families decidedRegime StrategicIntent45