Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Security ServicesInstruments of Denial and DeceptionIraq placed high priority on monitoring UN inspectionteams, as well as the political dynamic of UNpolicy toward Iraq. Former Regime offi cials state thatthe Iraqi security services, along with select militaryelements, played critical roles in guarding Saddamand other key members of the Regime, enforcingRegime policies, and protecting Iraqi military andsecurity activities. (See Annex B “Iraqi IntelligenceServices” and Annex C “Iraqi Security Services”Annex for additional information.)The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)The IIS, responsible for counterintelligence, wasthe lead organization charged with monitoring UNinspection activities and personnel. IIS directoratescarried out human, technical and electronic surveillanceof the UN in Iraq to detect intelligence agentsand to predict which sites were to be inspected so thatthose sites could be sanitized.• IIS personnel accompanied all UNSCOM andUNMOVIC inspection convoys, according to aformer senior Iraqi offi cial. The IIS believed that allforeigners were spying on the security of SaddamHusayn or were seeking military or securityinformation. The IIS believed that UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 1441 was very tough and thatit was important to engage in counterintelligenceactivities to protect against the loss of importantinformation. IIS “minders” traveled with communicationsintercept equipment in their vehicles inorder to listen to UNSCOM communications whileon the move, though this strategy was not usedagainst UNMOVIC in 2002 and 2004 out of fear ofdetection.• In the early and mid-1990s, the IIS was taskedwith clandestine monitoring of UNSCOM weaponsinspectors and their communications, as well asattempting to recruit or turn UNSCOM members,according to a former IIS offi cial. As soon as theUNSCOM mission began focusing on presidentialsites, the SSO became actively involved in theinspection process.• IIS personnel were directed to contact facilities andpersonnel in advance of UNMOVIC site inspections,according to foreign government information.The IIS developed penetrations within the UN andbasic surveillance in country to learn future inspectionplans. IIS offi cials also had the responsibilityof organizing protests at UNMOVIC inspectionsites.• According to presidential secretary ‘Abd HamidMahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri, during the mid-tolate1990s Saddam issued a presidential decreedirecting the IIS to recruit UNSCOM inspectors,especially American inspectors. To entice theircooperation, the IIS was to offer the inspectorspreferential treatment for future business dealingswith Iraq, once they completed their duties with theUnited Nations. Tariq ‘Aziz and an Iraqi-Americanwere specifically tasked by the IIS to focus on aparticular American inspector.• The IIS Directorate of Signals Intelligence (M17)conducted surveillance and collection activitiesdirected against UNSCOM and the UN, accordingto a former M17 offi cer. As with the rest of the IISeffort, M17’s objectives were the identifi cation ofspies and intelligence activities and the determinationof inspection sites before the inspection tookplace. M17 used a number of techniques includingsignals intelligence collection from fixed sites andmobile platforms, the bugging of hotel rooms, andeavesdropping on inspector conversations. The IISalso intercepted inspectors’ phone calls. As notedabove, M17 did not carry out these activities during2002 and 2003.• During UNMOVIC inspections in 2002 and 2003,the IIS was determined not to allow inspectionteams to gather intelligence as the Iraqis perceivedhad been done in the past. Members of the IISDirectorate of Counterintelligence (M5) dramaticallyincreased their physical observation of UNpersonnel during site visits, having as many as fi veminders per inspector. The IIS also attempted tobe extremely cautious in monitoring UNMOVICinspections in order to avoid international incidentsor being caught hindering inspection activities.52