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Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

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Although other <strong>Iraq</strong>i ministries were required to workwithin their formal budgets, Al-Ta’i could requestmore money from the Presidential Diwan. On someoccasions, however, the MoD supplemental budgetrequests were routed through Saddam’s secretary,Abid Hamid Mahmud, who could make decisionsmore rapidly than the Diwan.• Although Mahmud has stated that he had no role inMoD procurement, we judge that he played a rolein high-priority procurement for the MoD, based onhis position and statements by another high-level<strong>Iraq</strong>i military officer. This officer asserted that aSeptember 2002 supplemental request for Internetsatellite communications for the MoD was routedthrough the Presidential Secretary. The Secretariatsubsequently arranged for the purchase through aSyrian company.Ultimately, Saddam personally approved the fundingfor classified MoD, MIC, and IIS projects; informedthe governmental bodies of his approval via Mahmud,and used Mahmud to distribute supplemental fundingfor the projects.MoD Procurement ProcessAfter 1991, MoD procurement depended on thenature of the item required. If the UN prohibited thegoods, the illicit procurement process accomplishedthe procurement. If the items were dual-use goods,they were procured via the channels described elsewherein the chapter.Illicit Procurement for the MoD. After the UNimposed sanctions in 1990, member states were prohibitedfrom exporting conventional military goodsto <strong>Iraq</strong>. As a result, Saddam tasked the MIC to obtainprohibited materials and equipment on behalf of theMoD. According to al-Sattar, the former MoD CoS,the Minister of Defense coordinated all foreign illicitprocurement directly with the MIC.• The MIC and MoD negotiated specific weaponsprocurement requirements at a “CoordinationConference” held every three months at the MICheadquarters in Baghdad.Dual-Use Goods Defined“Dual-Use Goods” are items that might be of useto the military, but were not specially or originallydesigned or modified for military use. The term“goods” includes equipment, chemicals, materials,components (including spare parts), technology, andsoftware.The term “dual-use goods” can be contrasted with“military goods” that were specially or originallydesigned for use by the military.UN Sanctions on the Procurement of ConventionalMilitary GoodsAll member states of the United Nations were prohibitedfrom exporting conventional military goods to<strong>Iraq</strong> by UNSCR 661, 670, and 687. Some countries,however, failed to abide by these international agreementsand permitted their nationals to participatein the sale of conventional military goods to <strong>Iraq</strong>.Some nationals involved in this illicit arms trade wereassociated with, or in some cases directly related to,their national leaders. For more detailed informationsee and Annex H, UN Security Council ResolutionsApplicable to <strong>Iraq</strong> and Annex J: The Procurement ofConventional Military Goods in Breach of UN SanctionsAccording to a former high-ranking MIC offcial, aSpecial Committee for Procurement for the MIC,MoD, and SRG was established in mid-2002 (seeFigure 38). The Special Committee reviewed andrecommended security-related procurement requirements,which were then approved by Huwaysh, andultimately passed to Qusay for approval.• The committee’s first task was to develop <strong>Iraq</strong>’s airdefense system.• ISG has found very little corroborating evidence ofthe existence of this committee. Even if it coordinatedsignificant procurement in the nine monthsbefore the regime was removed, it is likely Saddamstill retained the final approval on expensive orpolitically sensitive procurement projects.Regime Financeand Procurement63

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