Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

tive Chairman Hans Blix, IAEA Director GeneralMohammed El-Baradei and an Iraqi delegationheaded by Naji Sabri. The results of these meetingswere mixed, although both Naji Sabri and Annanagreed that the talks had been a positive and constructiveexchange of views on the Iraq-UN relationship.In July 2002, Naji Sabri and Annan met again fortalks in Vienna, and Naji Sabri noted that it wouldtake a while to reach agreement on issues where therehad been “12 years of lack of contact” and “12 yearsof conflict.” Despite the positive tone of these meetings,very little substantive progress was made: Iraqstill refused to accept UNSCR 1284 or to allow UNweapons inspectors to return. As a result, UNSCR1441 imposed sanctions more harsh than those ofUNSCR 1284.President Bush’s speech to the UN General Assemblyon 12 September 2002, emphasizing the threatIraq’s WMD posed to global peace and security,unsettled Saddam and the former Regime’s leadership.Most chilling to them was the promise that“the purposes of the United States should not bedoubted. The Security Council resolutions will beenforced—the just demands of peace and securitywill be met—or action will be unavoidable.” Accordingto ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh,Saddam was “very stiff” when he discussed thissituation with his ministers some three weeks later,and was obviously still “feeling the pressure.” Collectively,there was an even greater fear among theRegime’s ministers that the United States unilaterallywould attack Iraq, than when Bush made his “Axisof Evil” speech in January 2002. Saddam told them,“What can they discover, when we have nothing?”But some of the ministers were not as sure. Huwayshsaid he began to wonder whether Saddam hadhidden something: “I knew a lot, but wondered whyBush believed that we had these weapons,” he said.Huwaysh could not understand why the United Stateswould challenge Iraq in such stark and threateningterms, unless it had irrefutable information.The Security Council’s unanimous decision on 8November 2002 to adopt Resolution 1441, whichfound Iraq in “material breach of all its obligationsunder relevant resolutions,” clearly demonstrated theseriousness of the international community. Resolution1441 required that Iraq “provide UNMOVICand the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional,and unrestricted access to any and all, includingunderground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment,records, and means of transport which they wishedto inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded andprivate access to all officials and other persons whomUNMOVIC or the IAEA chose to interview in themode or location of UNMOVIC’s or the IAEA’schoice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates.”UNMOVIC and IAEA were instructed “to resumeinspections no later than 45 days following adoptionof this resolution and to update the Council 60 daysthereafter.”Having held out for so long, Saddam initially didnot accept much of what UNSCR 1441 required.Although Russia and France were putting pressureon Iraq, Saddam felt the risk of war and even invasionwarranted re-acceptance of inspections. Accordingto Vice President Ramadan, Saddam eventuallypermitted UNMOVIC greater latitude than he hadinitially intended. Military leaders were instructed at ameeting in December 2002 to “cooperate completely”with the inspectors, believing full cooperation wasIraq’s best hope for sanctions relief in the face of USprovocation. According to a former NMD official, oneof the Regime’s main concerns prior to UNMOVICinspections was interviews of scientists. When askedwhy the former Regime was so worried if there wasnothing to hide, the source stated that any such meetingwith foreigners was seen as a threat to the securityof the Regime.Iraq’s cooperation with UN inspectors was typicallyuneven, and ultimately the Coalition considered theRegime’s efforts to be too little, too late. By January2003, Saddam believed military action was inevitable.He also felt that Iraqi forces were preparedto hold off the invaders for at least a month, evenwithout WMD, and that they would not penetrate asfar as Baghdad. He failed to consult advisors whobelieved otherwise, and his inner circle reinforced hismisperceptions. Consequently, when Operation IraqiFreedom began, the Iraqi armed forces had no effectivemilitary response. Saddam was surprised by theswiftness of Iraq’s defeat. The quick end to Saddam’sRegime brought a similarly rapid end to its pursuit ofsanctions relief, a goal it had been palpably close toachieving.62