Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

never part of the military plan crafted to defeat the2003 Coalition invasion.Senior military officers and former Regime officialswere uncertain about the existence of WMD duringthe sanctions period and the lead up to OperationIraqi Freedom because Saddam sent mixedmessages. Early on, Saddam sought to foster theimpression with his generals that Iraq could resist aCoalition ground attack using WMD. Then, in a seriesof meetings in late 2002, Saddam appears to havereversed course and advised various groups of seniorofficers and officials that Iraq in fact did not haveWMD. His admissions persuaded top commandersthat they really would have to fight the United Stateswithout recourse to WMD. In March 2003, Saddamcreated further confusion when he implied to hisministers and senior officers that he had some kind ofsecret weapon.• Prior to December 2002, Saddam told his generalsto concentrate on their jobs and leave the rest tohim, because he had “something in his hand” (i.e.“something up his sleeve”), according to Ministerof Military Industrialization ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘AbdallahAl Mullah Huwaysh.• Saddam surprised his generals when he informedthem he had no WMD in December 2002 becausehis boasting had led many to believe Iraq had somehidden capability, according to Tariq ‘Aziz. Saddamhad never suggested to them that Iraq lacked WMD.Military morale dropped rapidly when he toldsenior officers they would have to fight the UnitedStates without WMD.• Saddam spoke at several meetings, including thoseof the joint RCC-Ba’th National Command and theministerial council, and with military commandersin late 2002, explicitly to notify them Iraq had noWMD, according to the former presidential secretary.Saddam called upon other senior officials tocorroborate what he was saying.Iraq’s Movement of Critical Defense AssetsFrom the mid-1990s to Operation Iraqi Freedom,Iraq continued to move and conceal key air defenseequipment and other military assets to ensure theirsurvivability. Interviews with former Regime offi cialsindicate that the Iraqis felt threatened after PresidentBush’s “Axis of Evil” speech on 29 January 2002, andthey increased movements of critical military equipmentsoon afterward.• The biggest perceived threat to Iraq’s militaryequipment was cruise missiles; so military itemswere moved from location to location. The HigherCommittee never thought that these movementswould be seen as suspicious because they were carriedout to preserve military equipment, accordingto former Deputy Prime Minister Tariq ‘Aziz.• Between August 2002 and early January 2003, theIraqi military had taken measures to prepare for ananticipated US military attack on Iraq, accordingto a former IIS offi cial. These measures includedthe movement and hiding of military equipment andweapons. Army leaders at bases throughout Iraqwere ordered to identify alternate locations and totransfer equipment and heavy machinery to off-baselocations, taking advantage of farms and homes tohide items.A recovered 2002 document outlines the Iraqi evacuationplan to protect key military industries and equipmentfrom Coalition air strikes or threats. The formerRegime developed these concepts in response to lessonslearned after Desert Storm and Desert Fox. Thereport outlines the importance of utilizing a properlyconcealed Iraqi railroad system along with trucks andpre-equipped trailers to move important laboratories,equipment, and machinery.Regime StrategicIntent• In Saddam’s last ministers’ meeting, convened inlate March 2003 just before the war began, he toldthe attendees at least three times, “resist one week65