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Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

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<strong>Iraq</strong>’s Relationship With RussiaThe former <strong>Iraq</strong>i Regime sought a relationshipwith Russia to engage in extensive arms purchasesand to gain support for lifting the sanctions in theUNSC. Saddam followed a two-pronged strategy topursue weapons capability while also coping withsanctions imposed following invasion of Kuwait. TheRegime continued to import weapons and technicalexpertise, while seeking diplomatic support forlifting/easing sanctions. <strong>Iraq</strong> sought to tie other countries’interests to <strong>Iraq</strong>’s through allocating contractsunder the OFF program and entering into lucrativeconstruction projects to be executed once sanctionshad been lifted. At best, the <strong>Iraq</strong>i strategy producedmixed results. Russian commercial interests provideda motivation for supporting <strong>Iraq</strong>; Russian politicaland strategic interests set limits to that support.• March 1997: Russian Energy and Fuels MinisterRodinov went to Baghdad to discuss a $12 billiondeal in an effort to build economic relations with<strong>Iraq</strong>. The deal was signed and was scheduled tobegin once sanctions were lifted.• In 1991, only 15 of <strong>Iraq</strong>’s 73 discovered fields hadbeen exploited. Development of these reserves inthe post-sanctions period would provide the formerRegime with greater leverage in the world oilmarket. Accordingly, <strong>Iraq</strong> entered into lucrative oilexploration and exploitation contracts. The lion’sshare of these contracts went to Russian companies.For example, Lukoil received a $4 billion contractin 1997 to develop the second Qurna field, and inApril 2001 Zarubezhchneft and Tatneft received acontract worth $11.1 billion to drill in three <strong>Iraq</strong>i oilfields. In 2002, a contract was negotiated—but notsigned—for Russian firms to begin exploration ofseveral <strong>Iraq</strong>i oil fields over a ten-year period. Executionof these contracts was to commence duringsanctions and be fully implemented once sanctionhad been lifted. <strong>Iraq</strong> hoped these contracts wouldprovide Russia, and other nations, with a significanteconomic interest in pushing for the removal ofsanctions.Regime StrategicIntent• 1999: A Russian delegation traveled to <strong>Iraq</strong> to provideexpertise on airframes and guidance systemsfor missiles.• Under OFF, 32 percent of the <strong>Iraq</strong>i contracts wentto Russia.<strong>Iraq</strong>i attempts to use oil gifts to influence Russianpolicy makers were on a lavish and almost indiscriminatescale. Oil voucher gifts were directed acrossthe political spectrum targeting the new oligarchclass, Russian political parties and offi cials. Lukoil,a Russian oligarch-controlled company received inexcess of 65 million barrels (amounting to a profi t ofnearly 10 million dollars); other oligarch companiessuch as Gazprom and Yukos received lesser amounts;the Liberal Democratic Party leader Zhirinovsky wasa recipient, as was the Russian Communist partyand the Foreign Ministry itself, according to <strong>Iraq</strong>idocuments. (See Oil Voucher Allocations within theRegime Finance and Procurement chapter for additionalinformation.)39

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