Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Saddam’s PsychologyHow Saddam Saw HimselfSaddam’s psychology was shaped powerfully bya deprived and violent childhood in a village andtribal society bound by powerful mores. Many of hisassociates noted how early experiences had a lastingeffect on Saddam’s outlook.• ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid thought that “As any villagechild, he was affected by the traditions and customsof his tribe . . . you see him having an influence onmost . . . Iraqis because they have come from thesame country and tribal origin.”• ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwayshbelieved much of Saddam’s personality was shapedby the circumstances of his childhood, particularlyhis violent and xenophobic guardian uncle.• Saddam had few friends among top leaders even inthe 1970s and 1980s. These ties diminished furtherafter 1995 and he focused more on relatives,according to Tariq ‘Aziz.Saddam’s Personal SecuritySaddam thought he was under constant threatand he prioritized his personal safety above alladministrative issues. ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah AlMullah Huwaysh said Saddam put the priority forpersonal safety at the absolute peak of a hierarchy ofinterests. Some of his fear was well founded, but hegrew increasingly paranoid as the 1990s progressed.His personal security measures were extreme. Forexample, the SSO operated a laboratory specificallyfor the testing of Saddam’s food. An outgrowth ofhis fear was the building of multiple palaces, in partdesigned to foil attempts by attackers or assassins tolocate him. The palaces also reflected the fact thatSaddam increasingly saw himself as the state and thatwhat was good for him was good for Iraq.• Saddam went on a palace and mosque buildingextravaganza in the late 1990s, employing 7000construction workers, when much of the economywas at the point of collapse. His rationale for thiswas concern for his personal security. He stated thatby building many palaces the US would be unableto ascertain his whereabouts and thus target him.• Military officers as senior as the Commander of theSRG, who was responsible for physical protectionof Presidential palaces, were barred from enteringany palace without prior written permission.• ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwayshattributed much of this paranoia to Saddam’s senseof betrayal following the defection of HusaynKamil in 1995, shohe had previously seen as closeto him as a son. The attempt on ‘Uday’s life inDecember 1996 also had a deep impact on Saddam,because the extensive security infrastructuredesigned to protect him and his family failed in aspectacular and public way. The attack marks thestart of Saddam’s decreased visibility with seniorofficials and increased preoccupation with Regimesecurity.Saddam the Dynasty FounderSaddam’s resort to dynastic and familial means ofrunning Iraq did the most to undermine institutionaldecision-making. Saddam saw the state in personalterms and his career was marked by a steady retreatfrom the Ba’thist ideal of a modern state to governancemodeled on a rural Arab clan. His administrationbecame reliant on family and clan membersthroughout the 1990s. Tariq ‘Aziz and Taha YasinRamadan commented on the growing and corrosiveinfluence of the Tikriti clan on state control at thistime. Relatives dominated leadership positions andprogressively diminished the policy (as opposedto coercive) role of the Ba’th Party. Every seniornon-Tikriti in the Regime has pointed to Saddam’sincreasing and destructive resort to family and clanmembers to staff sensitive government positions. Nevertheless,while inclined toward a dynastic succession,Saddam prioritized preservation of his legacy. He wasstill searching for a competent and reliable successionthat would guarantee his legacy at the time of his fall.• Saddam gradually shifted his reliance on advicefrom technocrats to family members from 1995onward, according to Tariq ‘Aziz. This favoredRegime StrategicIntent21