Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

• Tariq ‘Aziz described the requirements for a leaderin Iraq as “power and an iron fist.” He was happyinitially with Saddam’s use of these attributes and“for the first ten years we thought he was doing theright thing.”• Former RCC member Muhammad Hamzah AlZubaydi was totally acquiescent, uncritical, andthought Saddam was “a good president.”• According to former Vice President Ramadan,when Saddam announced to the RCC in 1990 thathe was going to invade Kuwait, only he and Tariq‘Aziz expressed doubts about the plan, but they feltthey could only do so on preparedness grounds.Nevertheless, the invasion resolution passed unanimouslyand whatever dissent Ramadan and Tariq‘Aziz registered was insufficiently robust to havestayed in the memories of other participants in themeeting.• Yet Saddam’s lieutenants in the RCC and otherupper echelons were seen by lower levels of theRegime and the public as powerful and influential.Saddam was keen to maintain this perception.Opposition to his lieutenants’ views fromwithin the Regime was discouraged as criticism ofthem reflected on him. “When he gave his trust tosomeone, he didn’t want to hear criticism about thatperson,” according to ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid.A Few Key Players in an Insular EnvironmentIraq’s policymaking on national security issues,including WMD, rested with Saddam and majordecisions were by his fiat. He consulted a fewlong-serving advisors, but large deliberative bodieslike the RCC, the Ba’th Party leadership, Cabinet,Ministries, the military or the intelligence agenciesand industrial establishment were incidentalto critical decisions. Saddam reserved the right tomake final decisions, and former advisors reveal thathe often disregarded their advice. Saddam made fewpublic statements regarding WMD, and his deliberationswere tightly compartmented and undocumentedafter the 1980s. Saddam’s advisors have revealedLife Near Saddam—A CharacterizationSaddam’s Iraq was similar to other dictatorships.The primary characteristics of such regimes are: (1)an almost exclusive reliance upon a single decisionmaker,his perceptions and objectives; (2) fear andintimidation; (3) little dissent from the “leader’s”views; (4) compartmented expertise with little or nocross-fertilization; (5) the passing of misinformationthrough the chain of command; (6) internal personalconfl icts among second and third tier leadership; (7)a second level of leadership whose power and infl u-ence is derived entirely from above, not particularlyfrom the constituencies they represent; (8) avoidanceof responsibility. Toward the end of his rule Saddambecame more reclusive and relied even less uponadvisors for decision-making, while turning more andmore to relatives.much about a deliberate, secretive decision-makingstyle, which accounts for the lack of information (forexample, the lack of documentary evidence) on hisstrategic intent for WMD. Many, however, believethat Saddam would have resumed WMD programsafter sanctions were lifted.• Saddam maintained continuity and secrecy byrepeatedly turning to a few individuals and smallcompartmentedcommittees for foreign policy andnational security advice. Tariq ‘Aziz, althoughdeputy prime minister, served as the pre-eminentforeign policy advisor from the early years of theRegime until 2001. Saddam praised ‘Aziz for hisknowledge of the west and foreign affairs, in general,despite ‘Aziz falling out of favor in the laterstages of the Regime. Two successive committeesdeliberated over foreign policy issues referred tothem by Saddam: the Political Operations Room(1991 to mid-1990s), and its successor the Committeeof Four (the “Quartet” from1996 to 2003), (seeAnnex A, The Quartet—Infl uence and DisharmonyAmong Saddam’s Lieutenants for additional information).Additionally, Iraq established the HigherCommittee in 1991 to orchestrate relations withUN Weapons inspectors (see section on the HigherCommittee).Regime StrategicIntent7