Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

• According to ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud, on the secondday of Desert Fox, Saddam said, “[T] he cease-fireprinciple is over; the US broke the international lawand attacked a country, which is a member in theUN.” He drafted a resolution which called for theRCC “to cancel all the international obligations andresolutions, which Iraq has agreed upon.” ‘Abd saidthat Saddam blamed the United States for attacking“Iraq without the UN permission, and [pulling] theinspectors out of Iraq.” As a result, “Iraq [had] theright to cancel all these resolutions to get rid of thesanction which was imposed for more than sevenyears.”• The RCC resolution formally ended all Iraqi agreementsto abide by UN resolutions. Ahmad HusaynKhudayr recalled that Saddam’s text ordered Iraqto reject every Security Council decision takensince the 1991 Gulf war, including UNSCR 687.Ahmad said the resolution was worded in carefullegal terms and “denied all the previously accepted[resolutions] without any remaining trace of them[in the Iraqi Government].”• Saddam stressed to all those present in the officethat his decision was secret and not to disclose ituntil the decision was publicly announced, accordingto ‘Abd this admonition was also passed toRCC members.• Later that evening, Saddam addressed the RCC;Tariq ‘Aziz, Taha Yasin Ramadan, and Taha Muhyial-DinMa’ruf were among those present. Saddamasked the group’s opinion of his draft resolution.‘Abd remembered, “Tariq ‘Aziz started talking,because he has an experience in international foreignpolitics and was following the UN resolutionsfrom 1991 to 1998, and also a leader of the committeethat worked with the WMD inspectors in Iraq.He supported the resolution along with Ramadanand Taha Muhyi-al-Din Ma’ruf.”• Saddam signed three copies of the RCC-approvedresolution. One was passed to ‘Izzat Ibrahim AlDuri, another went to Ahmad Husayn Khudayr, andthe last was held by ‘Abd. According to both ‘Abdand Ahmad the resolution was kept secret for theremainder of the Regime. ‘Abd noted, however, thatSaddam said, “One day I will declare this resolution.”The secret nature of the RCC resolutionmeant that it did not see widespread implementationin ongoing administrative processes, notablyNMD operations.We do not know what measures were taken bythe former Regime after the secret resolution wasapproved, but a number of events may be linkedto it. The former Regime made public statementsand undertook potential WMD-related activitiesthat would seem to follow from the December 1998RCC resolution (for more information, see examplesfrom 1999 in the “Preserving and Restoring WMDAssets and Expertise” sub-section below). ‘Abd andAhmad, however, claim that they know of no specificresponses by the former Regime to the resolution.‘Abd stated that no action was taken because thesecret resolution—despite its apparent gravity—wasnot distributed and remained limited to the threeoriginal copies.• Taha Yasin Ramadan, also present for the secretRCC decision, held a press conference shortly afterthe end of the Desert Fox campaign and repeatedlytermed Iraq’s compliance with UN requirementsas something in the past: “The same applies to theblockade, which has lasted too long and which isnow behind us,” he declared. “There are no terms[to end the conflict]. We don’t accept any conditions.Everything in the past is behind us now.” “Iam not talking about the details. What I am sayingis that all that has to do with inspections, monitoring,and weapons of mass destruction is now behindus.” UN inspectors were denied access to Iraq untillate 2002, when the threat of war caused Saddam torelent.• Struggling to explain Saddam’s motives behind thesecret resolution, Ahmad Husayn Khudayr offeredthat Saddam might have been attempting to save“face” by publicly accepting UN mandates butrejecting them in private. By doing this he couldthen reveal the resolution in the future and claimthat he had never really stopped fighting. However,Ahmad’s reasoning is debatable: Saddam passedthe secret order in the midst of an attack—suggestinga more resolute frame of mind—rather thanimmediately prior to an act of forced compliance.58