Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

• According to captured documents, four contractswith Russian firms were signed in December 2001.These are detailed in figure 61. A 25 January 2003letter from the MIC front company Al-Basha’ircomplained to the Minister of the MIC that thesedeliveries had not been completed as of January2003.North KoreaFrom 1999 through 2002, Iraq pursued an illicitprocurement relationship with North Korea formilitary equipment and long-range missile technology.The quantity and type of contracts enteredbetween North Korea and Iraq clearly demonstratesSaddam’s intent to rebuild his conventional militaryforce, missile-delivery system capabilities, and indigenousmissile production capacity. There is no evidence,however, to confirm that North Korea deliveredlonger-range missiles, such as Scud or Scud-variants.weapons-related sales, discussed the supply of“technology for SSMs with a range of 1,300 kmand land-to-sea missiles with a range of 300 km.”The Changwang Group proposed a multitiered saleof weapons and equipment and “special technology”for the manufacture and upgrade of jammingsystems, air defense radar, early warning radars,and the Volga and SAM-2 missiles.• In a recovered transcript of a telephone conversationprior to the October 2000 meeting, seniorofficials at the MIC and the IIS noted topics fordiscussion with the North Korean delegation wouldbe the development of SSMs. The Iraqi delegationat the meeting included SSM Commander NajamAbd’Allah Mohammad. Ensuing discussions duringthe meeting focused on the transfer of militaryequipment including a short-range “Tochka-like”ballistic missile that the North Korean firm saidcould be purchased from Russia.Regime Financeand ProcurementNorth Korean and Iraqi procurement relationsbegan in 1999 when the MIC requested permissionfrom the Presidential Secretary to initiate negotiationswith North Korea. In a recovered memo theSecretary approved the plan and directed the MIC tocoordinate negotiations with both the IIS and MoD.Recovered documents further suggest that orders fornegotiations were also passed from Saddam directlyto the Technology Transfer Office at the IIS. Relateddocuments from this time period reveal that the NorthKoreans understood the limitations imposed by theUN but were willing “to cooperate with Iraq on theitems it specified.”The Director of the MIC formally invited a NorthKorean delegation to visit Iraq in late 1999. TheDirector of North Korea’s Defense Industry Departmentof the Korean Worker’s Party eventually visitedBaghdad in October 2000, working through a Jordanianintermediary. Multiple sources suggest Iraq’sinitial procurement goal with North Korea was toobtain long-range missile technology.• August 1999 correspondence between the IISDirector and a North Korean company calledthe Changwang Group (variant Chang Kwang orChang Gwang), a known company associated with• A captured MoD memo dated 12 October 2000summarized the October 2000 meetings, stating thatSSM Commander Najam Abd’ Allah Mohammadhad discussed Tochka, Scud, and No Dong missileswith a range of 1,500 km.• Muzahim Sa’b Hasan al-Nasiri, a Senior MICDeputy and a main player in procurement negotiationswith North Korea, in interviews has adamantlydenied the discussion of longer-range missiles withthe North Koreans.Documentary evidence shows that, by mid-2001, Iraqhad signed $10 million of military- related procurementcontracts with North Korean companies.• The contracts from late 2000 included a deal withthe Al-Harith Company, believed to be associatedwith Iraqi air defense development, and the Al-Karamah State Establishment, known to procuretechnology for missile guidance development, toimprove Iraqi SSM guidance and control technology,and to upgrade the Iraqi Volga missile hominghead by adding infrared sensors.119