Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

The Regime TimelineDecline (1991-96)For an overview of Iraqi WMD programs and policychoices, readers should consult the Regime Timelinechart, enclosed as a separate foldout and intabular form at the back of ISG report. Covering theperiod from 1980 to 2003, the timeline shows specifi cevents bearing on the Regime’s efforts in the BW,CW, delivery systems and nuclear realms and theirchronological relationship with political and militarydevelopments that had direct bearing on the Regime’spolicy choicesReaders should also be aware that at the conclusionof each volume of text, we have also included foldoutsummary charts that relate infl ection points—criticalturning points in the Regime’s WMD policymaking—toparticular events, initiatives, or decisions theRegime took with respect to specific WMD programs.Infl ection points are marked in the margins of the textwith a gray triangle.Ambition (1980-91)During the Ambition phase in Iraq, Saddam and hisRegime practiced open, traditional procurement ofconventional weapons and developed clandestinemethods for obtaining WMD materials and dual-useitems. Iraq’s oil wealth allowed Saddam to overcomethe inherent inefficiencies of a centrally plannedeconomy. After the costly war with Iran, Saddam’sprocurement efforts focused primarily on restockingIraq’s war materials. These defense-related procurementgoals, however, were hindered by economicweakness. In the later part of this period, the Iraqieconomy began to falter, saddled with a high internationaldebt from the war, rising costs of maintaininga generous welfare state, low international oil prices,and the high cost entailed in weapons and WMDprograms. Saddam’s ill-conceived, shortsighted economicreforms in 1987 and reactionary price controls,nationalization, and subsidies in 1989 pushed theIraqi economy further into crisis. Capping the Ambitionphase, Saddam chose to fight his way out ofeconomic crises by invading Kuwait.In the post-Gulf war decline phase, the possession ofWMD remained important to the Regime. Saddam’sprocurement of conventional weapons and WMD,however, was hindered severely by a potent combinationof international monitoring and a collapsingoil-based economy. These constraints were compoundedby the decision not to make full WMDdisclosures and the subsequent attempt to removeWMD signatures through unilateral destruction.The poor handling of the WMD disclosures furtherhardened the international community. UN sanctions,resulting from Saddam’s refusal to comply withUN resolutions, froze the Regime’s export of oil andimport of commodities—cutting off Saddam’s abilityto generate the revenue needed for illicit purchaseson international arms and dual-use markets. The Iraqieconomy also suffered under UN sanctions duringthis period as gross domestic product (GDP) percapita fell from $2304 in 1989 to an estimated $495in 1995. The decline in the street-value of the IraqiDinar rendered the average Iraqi citizen’s savingsworthless, casting the Iraqi middle-class into poverty.Simultaneously, this period of decline exhibited anincrease in corruption, incompetence, and patronagethroughout Saddam’s Regime.Husayn Kamil’s flight to Jordan in 1995 andSaddam’s handling of the issue led to further WMDdisclosures and subsequent international opprobrium.Saddam retained a desire for WMD, but economicgrowth and the ending of sanctions became the overridingconcern as the economy hit rock bottom inlate 1995. The combination of these factors motivatedSaddam’s decision to accept UNSCR 986, theUN OFF in 1996.Recovery (1996-98)The Recovery phase was ushered in by Saddam’sacceptance of UN SC 986 and the UN OFF Program.Trade fostered under the OFF program startingin 1997 allowed Saddam to pursue numerous illicitrevenue earning schemes, which began generatingsignificant amounts of cash outside of the auspices ofthe UN. With the legitimate side of the OFF programRegime Financeand Procurement9