Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

‘Izzat Ibrahim Al DuriChairman‘Abd Hamid MahmudAl Khatab Al NasiriSecretary GeneralZuhayr Talib‘Abd-al-SattarDirector, DGMIQusay SaddamHusaynDirector, SSOTahir Jalil HabbushDirector, IISRafi’ ‘Abd-al-LatifTulfah Al NasiriDirector, DGSThe National Security CouncilThe National Security Council provided a forum forcooperation between Iraq’s security and intelligenceagencies regarding overlapping issues among theagencies and joint-service projects. It was comprisedof ‘Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud AlKhatab Al Nasiri, and the directors of the four mainsecurity and intelligence organizations—the SpecialSecurity Organization (SSO), the Iraqi IntelligenceService (IIS), the Directorate of General MilitaryIntelligence (DGMI), and the Directorate of GeneralSecurity (DGS).‘Izzat Ibrahim, Vice-President and the Vice-Chairmanof the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC),acted as the chairman, and ‘Abd acted as the SecretaryGeneral of the National Security Council. TheCouncil did not have regular preplanned meetings,but it met periodically at ‘Izzat’s headquarters atAl Admani Palace in Baghdad to address any problemsor issues that had emerged since the last meeting.Despite these meetings most problems—big orsmall—were brought directly to Saddam by the agencies’directors.The presidential secretary, ‘Abd, screened almost allof the reporting sent to the Presidential Office by theSSO, IIS, DGMI, and DGS. The directors of theseorganizations, including Qusay Saddam Husayn, whoheaded the SSO, reported directly to ‘Abd, who chosewhat should proceed to the President. The correspondencefrom the SSO and IIS was opened by the presidentialsecretary himself, and not the staff. ‘Abd thenevaluated whether it was for the President’s action orDaily Brief. If the matter related to routine administration,the Secretary acted on the correspondence,himself, and then he returned it to the originatingoffi ce. However, this did not include the hiring andfi ring of department directors.The presidential secretary had a higher status thanQusay prior to 2001. Qusay, as Director of the SSO,still had to report to ‘Abd despite being the President’sson. Qusay was no longer within ‘Abd’s chainof responsibility after Qusay was elected to the Ba’thParty Leadership in May 2001, however, the SSO wasstill required to report to the presidential secretary.86