Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

secure Saddam’s support for odd or marginal programsof little use to defense. For example, retireddefense scientist ‘Imad ‘Abd-al-Latif ‘Abd-al-Ridhasecured Saddam’s backing in January 2000 forthe Al Quds UAV program over the objections ofHuwaysh. The project never progressed beyond twoprototypes and Huwaysh stated that the programwas ultimately an expensive failure.• Saddam was “like a computer,” according to ‘Abd:if he received reliable information he would makegood decisions, but if the inputs were flawed, theresulting policies would suffer.• ‘Abd said key Regime members “habitually” concealedfrom Saddam unpleasant realities of Iraq’sindustrial and military capabilities and of publicopinion. Fear of the loss of position motivated thisdeception, which continued until the final days ofthe Regime.• Asked how Saddam treated people who broughthim bad news, ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid replied, “I don’tknow.” ISG assesses that ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid hasnever known any instance of anybody bringing badnews to Saddam.Regime StrategicIntentWeaving a Culture of LiesThe growth of a culture of lying to superiors hurtpolicymaking more than did the attendant gossip.Lying to superiors was driven by fear of the Regimeand the inability to achieve results as resources deterioratedunder sanctions in the first half of the 1990s.Lack of structural checks and balances allowed falseinformation to affect Iraqi decision making withdisastrous effects. Saddam knew his subordinates hada tendency to lie, but his earlier efforts to check theirclaims by “ground-truthing” them through personaltours of inspection decreased by 1998 as he becamemore reclusive.• Tariq ‘Aziz asserts that before Operation IraqiFreedom, the Iraqi military lied to Saddam about itspreparedness, which led Saddam to grossly miscalculateIraq’s ability to deter an attack.• Several sources claim that reporting up the party,government, and military chain of commandbecame less trustworthy before Operation IraqiFreedom. Key commanders overstated their combatreadiness and willingness to fight, and Saddam nolonger sought ground truth by visiting units andasking pointed questions as he had during the Iran-Iraq war. He instead relied upon reports by officerswho later admitted misleading Saddam about militaryreadiness out of fear for their lives.Saddam Became Increasingly InaccessibleSaddam encouraged a sense of his omnipotenceamong his subordinates, a condition that increasedafter 1998 as Saddam became more physicallyreclusive. The former workaholic and micromanagerappeared less engaged after this time, although hewould involve himself in issues of interest, such as airdefense. Saddam’s inaccessibility was driven by anextreme fear of assassination and also apparently bya personal prioritization of other activities, includingwriting. While there is no evidence Saddam’s controlof the Regime slipped, many of his lieutenants saw asharp lessening of Saddam’s attention to detail and anabsence of his previous desire to “ground proof” highlevel advice through field inspections. They suggesthis formerly detailed interest in military affairs diminishedcompared to that shown during the Iran-Iraqwar or Desert Storm.• By Saddam’s own account, he had only used a telephonetwice since 1990, for fear of being locatedfor a US attack.• According to Ramadan, he never phoned Saddamdirectly after 1991, never privately socializedwith him and was often unable to locate Saddamfor days, even in periods of crisis. Simply locatingSaddam could be a problem even for seniorofficials. Ramadan said, “Sometimes it would takethree days to get in touch with Saddam.”11