Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

MoD’s Procurement Leadership at the Onset ofOperation Iraqi FreedomMinister of Defense: Staff Gen. Sultan HashimAhmad Al Ta’i. As the Minister of Defense, heapproved all MoD procurement proposals submittedby the Chief of Staff. Sultan was also a member ofthe “Committee of Three” which had oversight andcontrol over the Iraqi defense budget.Chief of Staff: Staff. Gen. Ibrahim Ahmad ‘Abd-al-Sattar Muhammad. Ibrahim was directly responsiblefor MoD procurement activities. He could reject, butnot grant fi nal approval on MoD procurement decisions.Director of Weapons and Supplies: Staff Maj.Gen. Taleb ‘Uwayn al-Juma’a Al Tikriti. Taleb wasresponsible for coordinating MoD weapons procurementvia the MIC from 1999 to 2003.Director of Armaments and Supplies: Brig. NabilRahman. Nabil was responsible for the procurementof products such as military uniforms, supplies, andother consumable items used to support militaryoperations.Ministry of DefenseUN sanctions after Operation Desert Storm severelyhindered the MoD’s overt procurement of weapons,ammunition, and other military goods. The Regime,however, did not abandon conventional militaryprocurement, developing instead an illicit procurementprogram based on supplemental budgeting, theMIC, and the use of other ministries to conceal theprocurement of dual-use goods.• The Presidential Diwan, Presidential Secretary, andSaddam Husayn developed a supplemental processto fund numerous programs outside of the statebudget, including the MoD’s illicit conventionalprocurement.• Saddam empowered the MIC to pursue his continuingillicit procurement, using front companies andtrade intermediaries to avoid international scrutiny.• As the UN OFF program opened additional tradeopportunities, non-security ministries would purchasedual-use items and redirect them to the MoD.• This mutually supporting relationship between theMoD, MIC, and Saddam’s illicit funding mechanismalso supported the procurement needs of theRG and SRG.MoD Procurement LeadershipThe Minister of Defense reviewed all MoD procurementand, in coordination with the PresidentialDiwan, could approve MoD procurement requirementsup to $2 million. The MoD Chief of Staff(CoS) and subordinate supply directors processed andcoordinated procurement requirements for approvalat higher levels, but could not approve MoD procurement.For procurement requirements greater than $2million, the Minister of Defense was required to participatein a more deliberative process involving theMIC, Presidential Secretary, and the President. TheMoD did not have final approval authority for thesehigh cost procurement programs.MoD Procurement DirectoratesAccording to Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al-Ta’i, theformer MoD, the Ministry of Defense was dividedinto directorates, the two largest being the Directorateof Armament and the Directorate of Weapons andSupplies. These two Directorates were the MoD’sprimary procurement organizations (see Figure 37).Directorate of Armament and Supplies. Accordingto Al-Ta’i, the Directorate of Armament and Suppliesprocured non-weapons related supplies necessaryfor the military to carry out its missions. Theseconsumable items included, but were not limited to,office supplies, military rations, and military uniforms.Directorate of Weapons and Supplies. Accordingto Al-Ta’i and Abid Hamid Mahmud al-Tikriti,the former presidential secretary, the Directorate ofWeapons and Supplies had two key procurementrelatedroles: acquiring weapons and ammunitionand supporting foreign procurement delegations.Prior to 1990, the Directorate of Weapons and Suppliesdirectly procured weapons and materials for theMoD from both domestic and foreign sources. Afterthe imposition of UN sanctions with UNSCR 661in 1990, the directorate was no longer able to obtainweapons abroad and depended on the MIC to executeforeign procurement.Regime Financeand Procurement61