Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Iraqi Intelligence Collection Against IranIraq’s intelligence services collected foreign intelligenceon Iran and relayed the raw reporting toSaddam via his presidential secretary. The governmenttightly controlled dissemination of material.This raw intelligence that went to Saddam would notnecessarily be shared even with the deputy prime ministeror military.• The National Security Committee, the body thatcoordinated Iraq’s intelligence services, advisedthe vice president in October 2001 that Iran wouldremain Iraq’s foremost enemy and that the Iranianswould rely heavily on missiles in a future war,according to captured documents.• IIS conducted extensive collection operationsagainst Iran, according to a former IIS senior offi -cer and various captured documents. Intelligencecollection as a whole targeted Iran’s weapons programs,its nuclear program, economic issues, andinternational relations. Human intelligence sourceswere the primary means of intelligence collectionagainst Iran, supported by signals intelligenceconducted by the IIS Directorate for Signals Intelligence(M17).• IIS had assigned 150 offi cers to work the Iraniantarget, according to a former senior IIS offi cer. TheIIS relied heavily on the MEK and independentassets in every province to monitor Iranian militaryand WMD developments. The Iraqis also studiedJane’s publications for information on foreignweapons systems. One senior offi cer spotlightedhow important the Internet was to their understandingof general threat capabilities.preparedness. Some Iraqis also believed the internationalcommunity would halt if not deter an Iranianinvasion. Saddam accordingly decided to use diplomacyas his primary tool against Iran, but he neverwielded it successfully. Iraq really had no coherentpolicy on how to deal with Tehran after Desert Storm,although, from the Iraqi point of view, the immediaterisk was deemed to be low.• According to the former Iraqi Army Chief-of-Staff(COS), Iran would have difficulty conducting alarge surprise attack because Iraq would detect theextensive mobilization required for it. Iraqi forwardobservers would detect Iranian troops as theyassembled along probable invasion corridors.• DGMI maintained over 10,000 files on Iranianorder of battle, including 3,000 photographs,according to a former intelligence officer. Intelligencereports with detailed, tactical informationabout Iranian infi ltration attempts also were forwardeddirectly to Saddam, according to captureddocuments.• The RG and Air Force provided detailed air orderof battle information for Israel and Iran, accordingto captured Iraqi documents. The documentsassessed probable Israeli Air Force tactics againstIraqi forces. Although much of this informationcould be obtained from open sources, it is significant that Iraq could “mine” it and apply it tomilitary planning.• Iraqi intelligence collected on the Iranian nuclearprogram in 2001, but did not contradict Iranianclaims that their reactors being used for peacefulpurposes, according to the former deputy directorof the IIS. Regardless, Iraq assumed Iran wasattempting to develop nuclear weapons. IIS assetsoften passed along open source information as if itwere intelligence, allowing disinformation to reachthe upper levels of the former Regime. Iraqi leadersacknowledged Iran’s advantages in population,income, and access to international arms markets—especiallyas Iraq’s former ally Russia beganto arm Iran.• Iraqi units were at least as good as their Iraniancounterparts. The former Iraqi Army COS saidIran enjoyed quantitative—not qualitative—groundsuperiority, according to the former defense minister.Although sanctions would have had a majorimpact, Iraqi forces arrayed along the border couldsurvive the first two echelons of an Iranian invadingforce without resorting to WMD. After that theywould be overrun.• One senior Regime official, however, said thatalthough the Iranian threat was real, Saddam exaggeratedit. Iraq considered Iran a historical enemywith desires for Iraqi territory.30