Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

The Economic Affairs Committee (EAC)In late 1995, Saddam reestablished the EAC to handleeconomic issues that would have normally goneto the Presidential Diwan (the EAC existed in the1980s but was abolished at an unknown date). TheEAC had influence over fiscal and monetary policyissues such as government spending, taxation, andimportation and interest rates. Only the head of thecommittee, rather than presenting them to the othercommittee members, handled some presumably sensitiveissues.The first method, which was common for most ministriesand organizations, was to apply for approvalfrom the EAC for the allocation of additional funds(see Figure 3).• These requests may have been submitted to thechief of the Presidential Diwan or the Secretary ofthe Council of Ministers (CoM), who would submitthe requests to Saddam. It is unclear how muchcontrol Saddam exerted during this phase of theprocess.• If the EAC voted positively, the Minister of Financewould send a directive to the CBI to send the prescribedamount to the domestic or overseas accountor accounts of the concerned ministry.• If there were a dispute regarding the approval, theissue would be elevated to the CoM for approval. Ifthe dispute were resolved in the requestor’s favor,the Minister of Finance would direct the CBI tocomplete the transaction.The second method was reserved for the military andsecurity service entities such as the IIS, the MoD,MIC, and other security organizations that submittedrequests for additional funds to the President. Theinformation on this procedure is often contradictory(see Figure 4).• According to the MoF, the Iraqi security organizationssubmitted written requests for additional fundsto the President, through either the Chief of thePresidential Diwan or the head of the PresidentialSecretariat. The latter, who was also the secretaryof the NSC, probably handled all requests from anysecurity organization, and may have been preferredby some organizational heads as he was consideredto be closer to the President.• The head of the MIC, the Minister of Defense,and the Governor of the CBI have also describedapproaching the Diwan for supplementary funds.The Chief of the Diwan and Presidential Secretarywere sometimes unaware of requests made to oneanother. Saddam reportedly did this to limit thenumber of people who had access to expendituredata. Requests sent to the Presidential Diwan weresometimes sent to the Diwan’s Economic Departmentfor study. The Chief of the Presidential Diwansometimes directed the head of the EconomicDepartment to discuss the request with the concernedminister. Both Khalil Mahudi, the Secretaryof the Council of Ministers (CoM), and MuhammedMahdi Al Salih, the trade minister, were formerheads of the Economic Department.• Organizations seeking budget supplements couldalso schedule a personal appointment with Saddam.Approval and Authorization of SupplementalFundingWhile Saddam was the primary approval authorityfor requests for extra funds, signed authorizationswere also issued from the Chief of the PresidentialDiwan or the Presidential Secretary (both wereauthorized to represent Saddam).If the supplement request were made during a personalmeeting between Saddam and the head of anIraqi security organization, Saddam would immediatelyapprove or disapprove the additional funds.• This verbal approval was put in writing and sent tothe requesting ministry, and a disbursal order wassent to the MoF.• Confirmation of these payments would usually bepresented as an order from the Presidential Secretaryto the Chief of the Diwan.Approvals for all other ministries would be issued inwriting to the concerned ministry and the MoF (It isunclear whether this includes the IIS, MOD, MIC,and Iraqi security organizations).• Disbursal orders sent to the MoF contained thedate, signature of approving authority, amount,but no information about the request. Documentscontaining details of the request, such as project16