Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Realizing Saddam’s VeiledWMD IntentRegime Strategy and WMD TimelineFor an overview of Iraqi WMD programs and policychoices, readers should consult the Regime Strategyand WMD Timeline chart, enclosed as a separatefoldout and tabular form at the back of Volume I.Covering the period from 1980 to 2003, the timelineshows specifi c events bearing on the Regime’s effortsin the BW, CW, delivery systems and nuclear realmsand their chronological relationship with politicaland military developments that had direct bearing onthe Regime’s policy choices.Readers should also be aware that, at the conclusionof each volume of text, we have also included foldoutsummary charts that relate infl ection points—criticalturning points in the Regime’s WMD policymaking—toparticular events, initiatives, or decisions theRegime took with respect to specific WMD programs.Infl ection points are marked in the margins of thebody of the text with a gray triangle.In the years following Iraq’s war with Iran and invasionof Kuwait, Saddam’s Regime sought to preservethe ability to reconstitute his WMD, while seekingsanctions relief through the appearance of cooperationwith the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)and the UN Monitoring Verification and InspectionCommission (UNMOVIC). Saddam’s initial approachunder sanctions was driven by his perceived requirementsfor WMD and his confidence in Iraq’s abilityto ride out inspections without fully cooperating.Interwoven into this basic fabric of Iraq’s interactionwith the UN were equally significant domestic,international, and family events, all influenced by andreflective of Saddam’s strategic intent. These eventscan be divided into five phases that cover the entireperiod 1980 to 2003.Ambition (1980-1991)The opening years of Saddam’s Regime are definedby a period of ambition. The 1980 to 1991 period isdominated by the Iran-Iraq war and its aftershock.The war was costly in financial, human and materielresources and led Iraq towards a period of insolvencyand decline. Further, the war taught Saddam theimportance of WMD to national and Regime survival;in doing so, however, it also highlighted Iraq’s activeWMD program to the world.A sharp increase in the price of oil in 1979, followinga series of earlier spikes, provided Saddam with afinancial base that he hoped to use to improve Iraq’scivilian infrastructure and modernize its military.Indeed the 1979 gains created a new plateau forhigher prices (more than $30 a barrel) through themid-1980s and created a hard currency windfall forIraq in 1980.The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, however, interruptedSaddam’s plans. Although Ayatollah RuhollahKhomeini threatened to “export [his] revolutionto the four corners of the world,” he viewed his bestopportunity to be among Iraq’s Shi’a majority insouthern Iraq. Khomeini therefore supported Shi’ademonstrations in 1979 and an civil unrest in 1980.Saddam sought to punish Khomeini for his meddlingand also sought to reestablish total Iraqi control overthe Shatt al-’Arab waterway, Iraq’s primary outlet tothe Persian Gulf. In 1975, Saddam had agreed underduress to share the waterway with the Iranians. In thefall of 1980, with Iran’s military weakened by internalpurges, Saddam believed an attack would be successful.He also felt that attacking Iran would enhancehis prestige with fellow Arab leaders who fearedKhomeini’s influence. Saddam launched in Septemberwhat he expected to be a short “blitzkrieg”campaign to take and hold territory in southern Iranto extort concessions from Khomeini and possiblycause his overthrow. The plan backfired. After severalinitial Iraqi victories, stiff Iranian resistance, stoppedand then rolled back Iraqi gains with heavy casualtieson both sides. This pattern of brutal thrusts, counterattacks,and prolonged stalemate continued for anothereight years, eventually drawing in the United Statesand the Soviet Union (both supporting Iraq), the UN,and several other regional and Third World states.Hostilities ended in August 1988, with no changefrom the 1980 political status quo, after both partiesagreed to a cease-fire on the basis of UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 598. The war exacted a significanttoll on Iraq, which lost an estimated 375,000 casualtiesand 60,000 prisoners and cost $150 billion, muchRegime StrategicIntent41