Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

• Former Minister of Defense Sultan HashimAhmad Al Ta’i: “We knew the goal was to makethe Regime fall . . . . We thought the forces wouldarrive in Baghdad or outside Baghdad in 20 daysor a month. We accepted that the cities on the waywould be lost. All commanders knew this andaccepted it. Saddam Husayn thought that the peoplewould, of their own accord, take to the streets andfight with light arms, and that this would deter theUS forces from entering the cities.”• Former commander of the Nebuchadnezzar RepublicanGuard Division, Staff Maj. Gen. HamidIsma’il Dawish Al Raba’i: “We thought the Coalitionwould go to Basrah, maybe to Amarra, andthen the war would end . . . Qusay Saddam Husaynnever took any information seriously. He wouldjust mark on the map. He thought most of us wereclowns. We pretended to have victory, and we neverprovided true information as it is here on planetearth. Qusay always thought he’d gain victory. Anycommander who spoke the truth would lose hishead.”• Saddam’s draft speeches and public addresses conveyedthis theme—an attack was unlikely, accordingto Tariq ‘Aziz.Tariq ‘Aziz on Saddam’s OverconfidenceDebrief, 23 June 2004Debriefer: You appeared confi dent. Your public statementswere exactly what you said—that Iraq wasprepared to defeat any American invasion.‘Aziz: Of course I said these things: How could Isay “I think we are making a mistake; we are notprepared for an attack?” That would be impossible.I had to say these things because this was my government’sposition, but it was true. A few weeks beforethe attacks Saddam thought that the US would not useground forces; he thought that you would only useyour air force.Debriefer: Wasn’t he aware of the buildup of forces inthe region?‘Aziz: Of course he was aware, it was all over thetelevision screen. He thought they would not fi ghta ground war because it would be too costly to theAmericans. He was overconfi dent. He was clever, buthis calculations were poor. It wasn’t that he wasn’treceiving the information. It was right there on television,but he didn’t understand international relationsperfectly.Regime StrategicIntent• Saddam was convinced that a show of force wouldbe sufficient to deter an invasion. The United Stateswould seek to avoid another Vietnam, according toa former senior Ba’th party member.• Saddam had concluded time was on his side andthat the Coalition would never be allowed to attack,according to the former science advisor.If WMD stocks existed, timing was the problem.The Coalition attack moved so rapidly that Saddamwas unable to exercise any options to use WMDand when he realized the end of the Regime wasnear, he was not prepared tactically to use anyWMD he might have had. Based on the statementsof former senior officers, the Iraqi military—includingthe RG—allegedly had no plans for employingWMD, had not practiced tactical use of WMD since1991, had no available stockpiles of WMD, had notdeployed any WMD to tactical units, and had no specialinfrastructure in place for handling WMD.• The 2nd RG Corps had chemical defense battalions,according to the former Al Quds Forces Chiefof-Staff,but these battalions left their equipmentin their barracks during Operation Iraqi Freedombecause the corps commander was confident theCoalition would not use CBW against Iraq. Theyprobably would have retained this equipment hadthe commanders envisioned using CBW munitionsin the 2nd RG Corps.• The RG did not use its special ammunition distributionsystem before either the Gulf war or OperationIraqi Freedom, according to a former senior Iraqiartillery officer. This system—specialized chemicalbattalions; replacement of company drivers withchemical battalion drivers and ammunition handlers;and use of special MIC depots—had servedit well during the Iran-Iraq war. The source com-67