Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Embassy to Jordan in Amman. The firm did notmanufacture goods; it simply acted as a broker forIraq.• The MIC procured banned items with the assistanceof the Iraqi CA in Jordan. In 2000, a formerhigh-ranking Iraqi official stated that a paymentof $2.275 million was made to a Lebanese companyfor BMP-2 (armored vehicle) 30-mm cannonbarrel-manufacturing technology. This technologyoriginated with an arms firm called Yugoimport-FDSP, a firm based in the former Federal Republicof Yugoslavia known for violating UN sanctions onIraq.Methods Used To Hide Illicit Procurement viaJordan. According to a high-level source from theAl-Eman network, the Jordanian Government aidedIraqi efforts to conceal its illicit trade activity throughits decision announced in October 2000 to terminatean inspection agreement with Lloyd’s Registry. Thisagreement, in force since 1993, permitted Lloyd’s toinspect only non-OFF goods coming through the Portof Aqaba. All OFF goods were monitored at all pointsof entry. Lloyd’s, however, was not required to reportillicit cargo (see Ministry of Transport section).• An Iraqi customs official with direct accessbelieved that the IIS operated several front companyoffices at the Turaybil checkpoint on theIraq-Jordan border. These included Al-Etimad andAl-Bashair. Any goods destined for these companiesreceived special treatment at the border.A Jordanian businessman with extensive businesscontacts with the former Iraqi Regime asserted thatofficial Jordanian approval was required for all tradewith Iraq. Individual shipments had to be approvedby the Jordanian security committee; the goods weresometimes photographed. Fawaz Zurequat, a possibleJordanian intelligence officer, who may have beenimprisoned after 1999 because of his involvementwith trading with Iraq, was a key Jordanian contact inthis process.• An Iraqi customs official believed that the tradewith Jordan was very useful for acquiring prohibitedgoods, particularly vehicles and computers.The Iraqi Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI)had two shipments per week through Turaybil after2000—Iraqi customs officials were not permitted tocheck these goods.Transport Routes for Procurement via Jordan. Iraqhad formal agreements with Jordan during the 1990s.Jordan was the primary route through which Iraqimaterial moved. The IIS had a presence at key Jordaniantransport nodes.• Abdul Karim Jassem (Abu Lika) was the IIS representativeat Al-Aqaba Port for three years until OIF.• Turaybil on the border of Iraq and Jordan was themain entry point for illicit trade. A former highrankinggovernment official asserted that the IIS,DMI, and the Directorate of General Security hadlarge offices there and enjoyed close liaison relationshipswith their Jordanian intelligence counterparts.Maj. Gen. Jihad Bannawi was head of the IISsection at Turaybil.• Al-Eman had its own shipping division to transportgoods to Iraq. It shipped goods through theJordanian, Syrian, and Turkish official bordercheckpoints according to an Iraqi businessman,the supplier shipped goods through Aqaba Port orAmman airport.Financing Procurement via Jordan. After 1999,the most important Jordanian contribution in assistingIraq’s illicit procurement apparatus was accessto Jordan’s financial and banking systems. An Iraqibusinessman assessed that before 1996, 95 percent ofIraqi trade was conducted through Jordanian Government-runbanks. After 1996, Jordanian banks handledonly 30 percent of that trade, mostly from Russia.Document exploitation reveals that the Central Bankof Iraq (CBI) and the Iraqi SOMO provided the fundsto Jordanian banks, which were spent by MIC, Iraqifront companies, Iraqi intelligence organs, and thecommercial and military attachés present in the IraqiEmbassy in Jordan.Regime Financeand Procurement101