Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

OverviewAnnex BIraq’s Intelligence ServicesRegime StrategicIntentIraq used multiple intelligence services to collect on the Regime’s various international and local concerns.The Iraqi Intelligence Service was the former Regime’s largest intelligence service; the Directorate of GeneralMilitary Intelligence and the Directorate of General Security supported the Regime on a smaller scale.Iraqi IntelligenceServiceDirectorate of GeneralMilitary IntelligenceDirectorate ofGeneral SecurityThe Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) served the Regime as a conventional intelligence service, but it alsoundertook denial and deception operations to thwart UN inspectors and for the illicit procurement of dual-usemateriel and military equipment. The Directorate of General Security (DGS) and Directorate of General MilitaryIntelligence (DGMI), however, generally performed intelligence and security operations in a comparablefashion to other countries’ intelligence services. This annex will provide a view of the most recent organizationalstructures of these security services.There are a few particular intelligence entities specifically involved in the WMD story:• IIS M4 collected overseas intelligence against UN Missions dealing with Iraq• IIS M4/4/5 provided support to sensitive, and sometimes illicit, procurement• IIS M5/4/14 conducted surveillance of all UN missions within Iraq• IIS M9 and M16 conducted “special substances” research and development• IIS M17 collected signals intelligence against the UN• IIS M20 assisted the aforementioned directorates in human surveillance• IIS M23 provided security to Military Industrialization Commission and Iraqi Atomic Energy CommissionfacilitiesThis portion of the Report is largely based on testimony from former Regime offi cials who were active in manyof Iraq’s former governing, economic, security and intelligence organizations. While they were critical to ourassessment of the former Regime’s WMD strategy, the detainees would often minimize their involvement orknowledge of sensitive issues. The placement of blame or knowledge with individuals, who were notin a position to contradict their statements, such as deceased or fl ed to another country, was also a commonoccurrence. Notwithstanding, most detainees were very cooperative and provided insight into the inter-workingsof the former Regime. Original documentation captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom has served toconfi rm, supplement, and reinforce detainee statements.73