Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Smuggling via Syrian PortsOpen sources reveal that a draft trade and securityagreement existed between Iraq and Syria thatcovered a variety of economic and political arrangements.These included the opening of the Syrian portsof Al-Latakia and Tartus for Iraqi imports. It tookapproximately two weeks to deliver cargo to Al-Latakiaor Tartus from Black Sea ports, according to asenior executive in the MIC.Sources asserted that a heavy pontoon bridge setprovided by the Ukrainian arms export firm Ukroboronserviceto Syria was ultimately supplied to theIraqi RG. It was initially delivered from Mykolayevon the Black Sea coast to Beirut in Lebanon on theMV Nicolas A, arriving in early October 2002. Theequipment was imported by the Syrian firm SESInternational, probably covered by a Syrian end-usercertificate. A delivery verification certificate signedby Syria’s Customs Department, verified by SES,indicated that the shipment had reached Syria bymid-October. Sources further revealed that elementsof the heavy pontoon bridge set had been delivered toRG forces at Fort Rashidiyah, near Baghdad by earlyNovember. Other elements were deployed to a rivercrossingtraining site between late October and earlyNovember of 2002.Figure 67. The port of Umm Qasr monitoredby UN inspectors, 1991-2003.The chart illustrates the facilitation role Iran played inIraqi oil smuggling. On two occasions in 1998, Irantook actions to stop oil smugglers from using its territorialwaters. The figure compiled by the MIF, clearlyindicates the impact this action had on the volume ofprohibited trade in the Gulf.Iran and the UAE were the most frequent destinationsfor Iraqi smuggled oil. The MIF also found thatthe majority of the smuggling vessels were owned byentities from these countries.Smuggling via the Arabian GulfThe Iraqi Regime frequently employed smugglerswho used oil smuggling routes through the northernArabian Gulf. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard CorpsNavy facilitated this illicit trade by providing safepassage through the northern Persian Gulf for Iraqioil smugglers in return for a fee. This arrangementallowed oil smugglers a safe passage through Iran’snorthern territorial waters, but smugglers remainedsubject to being interdicted by Iranian authoritiesfarther south (see figure 68).By calculating the $50 per metric ton of oil fee,the Maritime Interdiction Force (MIF) estimated in2000 that Iran was taking about 25 percent of theprofit from smuggled Iraqi oil (see figure 69). Thesehigh profits resulted from the difference between themarket price for crude oil and the low prices Saddamwas willing to charge to earn revenue that was nottracked by the UN.142