Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

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months to reach Baghdad from Bulgaria via the seaand multiple shipments by truck. An Iraqi businessmanhas confirmed that illicit equipment arriving inDamascus from Minsk, Belarus, was transferred toBaghdad via Syrian roads and railways.Open sources detail how the Habur bridge or gatenear Zakho on the border with Turkey was also ascene of illicit smuggling. The large volume of trafficacross Habur bridge (see Figure 65) hindered theadequate monitoring of cargo. Recent open sourcespoint to the fact that UN monitors were able toinspect only one in every 200 trucks that crossed intoIraq via this route.Other sources suggest that Iraq may have alsoreceived goods smuggled in by truck from Dubai viaSaudi Arabia. Illicit trade between Iraq and Iran wasalso problematic. Smuggling occurred on the roadlinking the Iraqi city of Al-Basrah and the Iranian cityof Khorramshahr. Iran exported foodstuffs, luxurygoods, and especially cement and asphalt along the40-kilometer highway. A former employee of the MICdeclared that the smuggling was under the protectionof both the Iraqi SSO and the Iranian RevolutionaryGuard Corps.There are a dozen official entry points into Iraq fromthe neighboring countries (see figure 66) of Jordan,Syria, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, threeair entry points at Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul andtwo main ports at Umm Qasr and Al-Basrah. As indicatedon the map, the UN monitored only five bordercrossings. The primary reason for the UN’s oversightcentered on the UN OFF Program. UNSCOM weaponsinspectors seldom visited Iraq’s border controlpoints because they were based in Baghdad. The UNcontracted two private companies from 1996 to 2003(Lloyds Register and later a Swiss company calledCotecna) to authenticate and certify the arrival ofhumanitarian supplies under the UN OFF Programat three land border points. (A fourth was addedjust prior to OIF and the port of Umm Qasr (seefigure 67).This left at least two major border crossings andBaghdad’s airport completely unmonitored. Even atthe monitored crossings, cargo not approved by theUN could freely enter Iraq because UN monitors onlydealt with UN OFF cargo. Any non-UN cargo couldfreely enter Iraq at either monitored or unmonitoredentry points.Smuggling by SeaDuring the sanction years, traders used a pool ofprivate dhows, barges, and tankers to smuggle oil outand commodities into and out of Iraq’s southern portswith relative ease. It is possible that easily concealedmilitary and dual-use items could have been transportedby this method.Smuggling via Jordanian PortsThe port of Aqaba in Jordan served as a maritimetransshipment point. Beginning in the mid-1990s,Lloyds Register provided monitoring of goods arrivingat Aqaba, but Jordan terminated the contract in2000. The IIS had a representative in Aqaba, overseeingillicit trade including shipments made by a MiddleEastern firm.From 1996 to March 2001, Mohammed Al-Khatib, aJordanian businessman, became the most prominentintermediary for the Indian company NEC. Al-Khatibruns the Jordanian transport companies named MK-2000, Jordan Oil Services, and the Jordan Establishmentfor Transit, all located at the same Jordanianaddress. Al-Khatib facilitated the shipping of illicitgoods to Iraq. Contraband was shipped by PacificInternational Lines Ltd and Orgam Logistics PTE Ltdfrom India (Bombay and Madras) to Aqaba in Jordan.In all the deals:• Al-Khatib was identified as the consignee.• All voyages involved transshipment, at least one viaDubai.• Goods were unloaded at Aqaba port by Al-Khatiband reloaded onto Al-Khatib company trucks foronward transit to Iraq.• All payments by Iraq were made to Al-Khatib withAl-Khatib paying other players in the logistics andsupply chain.• Iraq submitted tenders to NEC through Al-Khatib.Regime Financeand Procurement139
140Figure 65. A truck holdingarea near Habur Bridge BCPshowing the high volume ofborder traffi c into Iraq.
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Comprehensive Reportof the Special
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versus another. They deserve at lea
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In Saddam’s view, Iraq was the na
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UNSCOM gave a sufficiently positive
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The Regime, drawing on the experien
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December 1998. The United States an
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The new Iraq could benefit from the
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and the Baath party. This is a volu
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have been important, though they ha
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Regime StrategicIntentRegime Strate
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ContentsKey Findings...............
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AnnexesA. The Quartet—Influence a
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Key FindingsSaddam Husayn so domina
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Former Iraqi Regime Officials Varie
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Who Made Iraq’s StrategicDecision
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• Tariq ‘Aziz described the req
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• Instead, voluminous files were
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secure Saddam’s support for odd o
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Saddam’s Use of Execution—Manag
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solely for civilian use when the re
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directly and continuously to him. H
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How Saddam Saw HisSubordinatesMinin
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Saddam’s PsychologyHow Saddam Saw
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to consist of was hazy. His drive t
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Iraq’s Use of CW in 1991 Against
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Excerpts from a Closed-Door Meeting
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maker asserted that either country
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Israel“There can never be stabili
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Saddam’s handling of Iraq’s res
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this to the international community
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Regime StrategicIntentNote: Red cel
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Iraq’s Relationship With RussiaTh
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Realizing Saddam’s VeiledWMD Inte
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Selected UN Security Council Resolu
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Husayn KamilBorn in 1955 within the
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ibility with UNSCOM. Iraqi demands
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and the International Atomic Energy
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The Saga of the “Chicken Farm”
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Security Services (continued)The Sp
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VX Warhead Samples & The Iraqi Air
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success—reduced or suspended oil
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Preserving and Restoring WMD Infras
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• The Regime also sought diplomat
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Renewing UN InspectionsIraq allowed
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never part of the military plan cra
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• Former Minister of Defense Sult
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Annex AThe Quartet—Influence and
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Perceptions of Threat and Challenge
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OverviewAnnex BIraq’s Intelligenc
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Regime StrategicIntentThe Scientifi
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M6, Directorate of Internal Securit
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Structure of M14• Special Operati
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M18, Directorate of ResidencyM18 is
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Structure of M40• M40/1 Monitors
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OverviewAnnex CIraq’s Security Se
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The Special SecurityOrganizationSad
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Regime StrategicIntentThe Special S
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Structure of the SSO Security Branc
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The Republican GuardThe Republican
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The Republican Guard Forces Command
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Annex DSaddam’s Personal Involvem
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[Translator Comment: they are in go
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Regime Financeand ProcurementRegime
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ContentsA Word on the Scope of This
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MIC Banking and Financing .........
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A Word on the Scope of This Chapter
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Key FindingsThroughout the 1990s an
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ents. He made all modifications to
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Chapter SummaryThe Illicit Finance
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The Regime TimelineDecline (1991-96
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OverviewDirecting and Budgeting Ira
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Regime Financeand ProcurementFigure
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Iraq’s National Budget 1991-2002A
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OverviewFinancing Iraq’s IllicitP
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including abolishing universal empl
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Behind the scenes, the Iraqi govern
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for what they imported in 1992, pro
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Figure 10. Iraq’s estimated earni
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stated that he believed the Russian
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documents. Ten other Iraqi embassie
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were made to at least two Iraqi fro
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Figure 21. Iraq’s estimated earni
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SOMO Account Balances Outside of Ir
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with an *) shows the total proceeds
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seas accounts in Lebanon and Jordan
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and the overseas banks forwarded ac
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assets in employee-named accounts.
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OverviewExecuting Illicit Procureme
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necessary to accommodate the large
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offices, there was only a single em
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MoD’s Procurement Leadership at t
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Although other Iraqi ministries wer
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From 2000 onwards, the RG’s annua
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The information provided by these t
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its real activity, which was coordi
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• In May 2002, ARMOS was offered
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officer suggested Neptune would be
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• A foreign intelligence service
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MIC Research Support at Universitie
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Page 224 and 225: Figure 51. Sattam HamidFarhan Al-Ga
Page 226 and 227: Regime Financeand ProcurementFigure
Page 228 and 229: Supplying Iraq With ProhibitedCommo
Page 230 and 231: UNSCOM’s Operation Tea Cup (1995
Page 232 and 233: • The technology included guidanc
Page 236 and 237: Embassy to Jordan in Amman. The fir
Page 238 and 239: Regime Financeand ProcurementThis i
Page 240 and 241: Since 1991, Iraqi-Turkish trade rev
Page 242 and 243: cash through private sector trade o
Page 244 and 245: Chinese Assistance in Iraqi Telecom
Page 246 and 247: October 2001, Syrian technicians we
Page 248 and 249: • Yugoslav Federal also supplied
Page 252 and 253: jammers, night-vision devices, and
Page 254 and 255: • According to captured documents
Page 256 and 257: Transportation Routes From North Ko
Page 262 and 263: Materials, Equipment and Services P
Page 264 and 265: conflict, President Lukashenko inst
Page 266 and 267: Many transactions for prohibited go
Page 268 and 269: Importing ProhibitedCommoditiesDece
Page 270 and 271: International Commodity Deception:T
Page 272 and 273: Disguising the Commodity’s Destin
Page 278 and 279: Figure 68. Primary oil smuggling ro
Page 280 and 281: Annex ATranslations of Iraq’s Bil
Page 282 and 283: An ISG Translation of the 2003 Iraq
Page 284 and 285: Benzene for automobiles:If there is
Page 286 and 287: Secondly: oil derivativesThe Iraqi
Page 288 and 289: Fifteenth:Based on the Jordanian re
Page 290 and 291: Figure 1. The Iraq-SyriaTrade Proto
Page 292 and 293: Figure 2. Iraq-Syria TradeProtocol
Page 294 and 295: Figure 3. The Iraq-TurkeyTrade Prot
Page 302 and 303: Annex BKnown Oil Voucher Recipients
Page 304 and 305: Oil Allocation RecipientList (conti
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Oil Allocation RecipientList (conti
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Key Budgetary ActorsAnnex CIraq’s
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decision and issued a presidential
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• The NSC Auditing Division sent
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Annex DIraq Economic Data (1989-200
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Figure 8. Sectoralcomposition of Ir
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Figure 10. Iraq’s Paris Clubcredi
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Balance of Payments/Exchange RatesE
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Figure 16. Exchange rateID/USD.Regi
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Annex EIllicit Earnings Sources and
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account for half a year each, were
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Annex FIraqi Oil SmugglingCaptured
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ISG Translation of an Oil Sale Cont
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truck to the Turkish border. Althou
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Figure 22. Contractbetween the Nati
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Figure 22. Contractbetween the Nati
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Figure 24. Letter from A.J.Khazamip
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Figure 25 . Second letterfrom A.J.
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Figure 27. Contract forpetroleum pr
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Figure 27. Contract forpetroleum pr
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Figure 29. Contractbetween al Basha
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Figure 29. Contractbetween al Basha
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Figure 31. Telex from aFrench bank
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Figure 32. Unipack ofParis contract
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Figure 33. Telex from VitolGeneva t
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Figure 35. Letter dated 30December
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Annex GIraq’s Banking Systemdid n
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Figure 37. Department,department di
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anks for some transactions in the b
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Annex HUN Security Council Resoluti
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• UNSCR 1175 also noted that the
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Annex ISuspected WMD-Related Dual-U
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• An electrophoresis system inclu
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• The MIC initiated direct contac
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Annex JThe Procurement of Conventio
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Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions b
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Letters Dealing With a Planned Visi
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ack to Baghdad without repair. The
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specified that the Iraqi attendees
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• In April 1999, seven Russian en
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• The letter also indicates that
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• In another letter, SARA-M refer
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Possible Belarusian Breaches of UN
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Possible Syrian Breaches of UN Sanc
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• A recovered contract dated 20 F
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9k38 portable air defense systems (
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Annex KSuspected Intermediary andFr
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Atera ManufacturingDaei Internation
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Annex LProcurement AcronymsAcronymA
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IAFIraqi Armed ForcesIDIraqi DinarI
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TPICTTCUAEUAVUDMHUHFUNUNCCUNDPUNESC
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Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline Ev
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