Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

offices, there was only a single employee, but theoffice in Jordan ultimately employed four individuals,headed by a Commercial Counselor and includeda CA and a dedicated accountant. According to aformer high-ranking Iraqi Government official, theseindividuals were managed and paid for by the MoT,but reportedly acted independently and were notrequired to report back to the MoT.CAs worked from Iraq’s embassies abroad and servedas special trade ambassadors working in Iraq’s interest.Common roles for CAs included:• Working in the Iraqi Embassy to register foreigncompanies for trade with Iraq.• Supporting documentation shows that this was forBMP-2 IFV 30-mm cannon barrel-manufacturingtechnology from the Former Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (FRY).• There is no indication, however, from the documentationthat the CA staff was aware of the exactnature of the contract.• In the late 1990s the importance of the CA’s officein Jordan declined. A year before OIF, the MICremoved cash from the CA’s office in Jordanbecause of weak activity, and appointed a militaryrepresentative to represent its interests.Regime Financeand Procurement• Checking to see whether foreign companies shouldbe blacklisted for dealings with Israel.• Facilitating trade with foreign suppliers.• According to reporting, some IIS officers workedunder cover as CA. ISG assesses that it is possiblethe MoT was not aware of this IIS presence in itsranks.• According to Al Salih, CA in the trade protocolstates (Jordan, Syria, and Turkey) were aware of thebank accounts used to transfer protocol cash profits(30 to 40 percent of all contracts) into Iraq.• CAs in Jordan, and to a lesser extent, Syria andTurkey, also followed up on all Iraqi Governmentfinancial transactions from the trade Protocols.In the mid-1990s, the Jordan desk was the mostimportant CA for Iraq. The Amman CommercialCounselor and his deputy were responsible forfacilitating all UN OFF contracts, the trade protocolbusiness (the Syria and Turkey protocols did notexist until after 1999), and any additional privatetrade from the military and security service entities.Facilitating these contracts focused on opening lettersof credit in Jordanian banks and following up withpayment when receipt of the goods was confirmedin Baghdad. The CA accountant followed contractimplementation, tax collection, and tracked any fees.• As an example, captured documentation details thatindividuals at the CA’s office in Amman opened lettersof credit for the payment of $2.275 million to aLebanese company in 2000.According to the former Minister of Trade, the MIC,and SOMO arranged contracts with Syria directlythrough the CA in Syria and the Commercial Bankin Syria. It is more likely, however, that the CA inSyria had a less active role with MIC and SOMO,particularly in the payments process, because businessin Syria was conducted through payment on supplyrather than letters of credit.• Supporting intelligence shows in one case thatSOMO authorized the 5th Syrian Commercial Bankin Damascus to transfer funds directly to a Syrianmiddleman working for the Syrian-based SES withno mention of the CA.• In May 2002 Iraq’s Al-Basha’ir Trading Companyinstructed the Syrian firm where and how to distributefunds received from Iraq’s Oil Ministry (probablyon behalf of Iraqi military).As with the Syrian Protocol, the January 2000 TurkishProtocol operated on a payment on supply basis, andtherefore probably did not involve the CA in Turkey.59