Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Regime Financeand ProcurementThis information is based on the contracting entity, not necessarilythe benefi ciary entity.Figure 57. Allocation of the goods portion of the SyrianProtocol, 2000-2003.imports may have been destined for these end usersis not known. The SOMO database does not mentionany MIC transactions that were not explicitlycontracted for by MIC (see Figure 57).Most of Iraq’s military imports transited Syria byseveral trading companies, including some headedby high-ranking Syrian government officials, whocompeted for business with Iraq. Syrian traders wereoften paid under the auspices of the Syrian protocol,a government-to-government agreement, according tomultiple sources. According to a captured letter dated2 March 2002 and written on the letterhead of a MICfront company, Al-Basha’ir, a former MIC DeputyDirector stated that the North Korean Tosong TradingCompany would “be financed according to the Iraqi-Syrian Protocol…through SES International.”• The Central Bank of Syria was the repository offunds used by Iraq to purchase goods and materialsboth prohibited and allowed under UN sanctions.• According to the MIC Director Abd al-TawabMullah Huwaysh, Syrian traders who importedweapons and materials for Iraq worked extensivelywith MIC front companies. The Syrian traders werealso required to share their profits with the othertraders. The owner of the Syrian trading companySES, for example, frequently complained that hehad to give up too much of his profits to the othertraders.• Dhu al-Himma Shalish, head of Syrian PresidentialSecurity and a relative of Syrian President Basharal-Asad, owned the SES International, and wereheavily involved in the Iraqi weapons trade, accordingto a source with direct access.• Dhu al-Himma’s nephew Assif Shalish managedSES and its subordinates.103