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Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

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Preserving and Restoring WMD Infrastructureand ExpertiseThere is an extensive, yet fragmentary and circumstantial,body of evidence suggesting that Saddampursued a strategy to maintain a capability to returnto WMD after sanctions were lifted by preservingassets and expertise. In addition to preservedcapability, we have clear evidence of his intent toresume WMD as soon as sanctions were lifted. Theinfrequent and uninformed questions ascribed to himby former senior <strong>Iraq</strong>is may betray a lack of deepbackground knowledge and suggest that he had notbeen following the efforts closely. Alternatively,Saddam may not have fully trusted those with whomhe was discussing these programs. Both factors wereprobably at play. All sources, however, suggest thatSaddam encouraged compartmentalization and wouldhave discussed something as sensitive as WMD withas few people as possible.• Between 1996 and 2002, the overall MIC budgetincreased over forty-fold from ID 15.5 billion to ID700 billion. By 2003 it had grown to ID 1 trillion.MIC’s hard currency allocations in 2002 amountedto approximately $364 million. MIC sponsorship oftechnical research projects at <strong>Iraq</strong>i universities skyrocketedfrom about 40 projects in 1997 to 3,200in 2002. MIC workforce expanded by fifty percentin three years, from 42,000 employees in 1999 to63,000 in 2002.• According to a mid-level IIS official, the IIS successfullytargeted scientists from Russia, Belarus,Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, China, and severalother countries to acquire new military and defenserelatedtechnologies for <strong>Iraq</strong>. Payments were madein US dollars. The <strong>Iraq</strong>i Government also recruitedforeign scientists to work in <strong>Iraq</strong> as freelanceconsultants. Presumably these scientists, plus their<strong>Iraq</strong>i colleagues, provided the resident “know how”to reconstitute WMD within two years once sanctionswere over, as one former high-ranking <strong>Iraq</strong>iofficial said was possible.• Saddam met with his senior nuclear scientists in1999 and offered to provide them with whateverthey needed, and increased funding began to flow tothe IAEC in 2001, according to the former Ministerof Military Industrialization. Saddam directeda large budget increase for IAEC and increasedsalaries tenfold from 2001 to 2003. He also directedthe head of the IAEC to keep nuclear scientiststogether, instituted new laws and regulations toincrease privileges for IAEC scientists and investedin numerous new projects. He also convenedfrequent meetings with the IAEC to highlight newachievements.• Saddam asked in 1999 how long it would take tobuild a production line for CW agents, accordingto the former Minister of Military Industrialization.Huwaysh investigated and responded that expertscould readily prepare a production line for mustard,which could be produced within six months. VXand Sarin production was more complicated andwould take longer. Huwaysh relayed this answer toSaddam, who never requested follow-up information.An <strong>Iraq</strong>i CW expert separately estimated <strong>Iraq</strong>would require only a few days to start producingmustard—if it was prepared to sacrifice the productionequipment.• Imad Husayn ‘Ali Al ‘Ani, closely tied to <strong>Iraq</strong>’s VXprogram, alleged that Saddam had been looking forchemical weapons scientists in 2000 to begin productionin a second location, according to reporting.• Huwaysh stated that in 2001 Saddam approachedhim after a ministers’ meeting and asked, “Do youhave any programs going on that I don’t knowabout,” implying chemical or biological weaponsprograms. Huwaysh answered no, absolutelynot. He assumed that Saddam was testing him, soHuwaysh added that because these programs wereprohibited by the UN, he could not pursue themunless Saddam ordered it. Huwaysh said Saddamseemed satisfied, asked no further questions, anddirected no follow-up actions. The incident wasperplexing to Huwaysh, because he wondered whySaddam would ask him this question. While hehad no evidence of WMD programs outside MIC,Huwaysh speculated that Qusay had the abilitywithin the SSO to compartmentalize projects andselect individuals to do special work.Regime StrategicIntent59

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