Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

UNSCOM’s Operation Tea Cup (1995 to 1998)From 1995 to 1998, UNSCOM inspectors conducted“Operation Teacup,” a sting operation designed toreveal Iraq’s efforts to procure prohibited military andWM- related goods.• The operation was launched after the defectionof Saddam’s son-in-law, Husayn Kamil, in 1995.Thousands of WMD-related documents were capturedby the UN at Husayn Kamil’s chicken farm,including the al Samud contracts (see the HusaynKamil and The Saga of the “Chicken Farm” Documentsinsets in the Regime Strategic Intent chapter.)• As a result of this sting mission, the UN videotapedIraqi buyers (including Dr. Hashim Halil IbrahimAl ‘Azawi) negotiating with Romanians for prohibitedgyroscopes.• As a result of UNSCOM’s operation (see inset), theRomanian Government acknowledged in 1998 thatAerofina sold Iraq weapons parts in 1994 via anintermediary company in Jordan.According to a source with good access, a Romaniansource provided analytical equipment and testing forSG-4 tank gyroscopes and gyroscopes intended formissile applications to Iraq in the late 1990s. Thisequipment may have been used to ascertain the qualityof illicitly imported gyroscopes because Iraq couldnot manufacture them domestically. The name of theRomanian supplier was not specified.In March 1998, Iraqi intelligence conducted an operationto smuggle weapons and military equipmentfrom Romania in violation of UN sanctions, accordingto a reliable source. Walid al-Rawi, an IIS agentstationed in Romania, was sending pictures of tanksand military equipment available for sale from Romaniaback to Baghdad. An Iraqi diplomatic pouch wasused to transfer the photographs. There is no furtherinformation concerning the type, number, or source ofthe conventional military goods purchased.• Al-Rawi used Qatar and Dubai in the United ArabEmirates (UAE) as transshipment points for theillicit goods. Bribes were used to circumvent customsinspections at ports.Al-Rawi obtained financing for the military goodsby requesting money from Baghdad. If approved, thecash was reportedly sent to Romania via Geneva.According to captured documents, Romania’sUzinexport SA was contracting in October 2001 toprovide Iraq with equipment, machinery and materialslinked to a magnet production line for an IraqiV-belt drive project. This company worked with a mixof Iraqi front companies and intermediaries that wererepresenting the MIC, the Iraqi lead for the project.The magnets—assembled by the Iraqis with Romanianhelp—could have been suitable for systems usedto spin gas centrifuge rotors for the enrichment of uranium.Although there is no evidence that the magnetswere employed in the production of gas centrifuges,the capability to indigenously produce magnets wouldhave allowed Iraq to maintain knowledge and skillsetsin this area.• The various front companies and trade intermediariesinvolved in the project included the Jordanianbranch of the Iraqi firm Al-Sirat, the Jaber IbnHayan General Company, the Aa’ly El-Phratescompany, and the Ali Al-Furat Trading Company.Jordan may have been used as a transshipmentpoint for the magnet technology.• Captured documents indicate that the total sum ofthe contract awarded to Uzinexport for the V-beltproject was $4,607,546. This was paid though acombination of cash, letters of credit, oil, and rawmaterials.UkraineUkraine was one of the first countries involved inillicit military-related procurement with Iraq after thefirst Gulf war. Iraqi delegation visits to Ukraine werefirst evident in 1995. These visits were reciprocatedin Iraq from 1998 to 2003. The highest-levels of theUkrainian Government were reportedly complicitin this illicit trade as demonstrated by negotiationsconducted in regard to the sale of a Kolchugaantiaircraft radar system to Iraq in 2000. In addi-Regime Financeand Procurement95