Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

success—reduced or suspended oil production in anattempt to influence decision-making in the SecurityCouncil. Iraq controlled the contracting process forboth selling its oil and arranging purchases of humanitariangoods and it took advantage of lax UN oversight.To try to garner diplomatic support in the UN,the former Regime ensured that Chinese, French andRussian energy firms, as well as others representingstates sympathetic to Iraq, were prominent recipientsof oil contracts. Iraq also manipulated oil contractsby imposing an illegal “surcharge” on every barrelsold. Furthermore, Iraq’s neighbors Syria and Turkeynegotiated formal, but technically illegal trade protocolswhich allowed Iraq to provide oil at discountedprices for hard currency or items it could not obtainthrough OFF. Trade with Syria flourished, providingIraq with the largest share of its illegal hard currencyrevenues by 2002. (See Syrian Trade Protocol, underthe Regime Finance and Procurement chapter foradditional information.)Saddam invested his growing reserves of hard currencyin rebuilding his military-industrial complex,increasing its access to dual-use items and materials,and creating numerous military research anddevelopment projects. He also emphasized restoringthe viability of the IAEC and Iraq’s former nuclearscientists. The departure of UN inspectors and Iraq’srefusal to allow their return permitted MIC to purchasepreviously restricted dual-use materials andequipment that it needed for both weapons developmentand civilian applications. In addition, MIC hadgreater flexibility in adapting civilian technology tomilitary use. Yet without inspectors to certify Iraq’sultimate compliance with UNSC resolutions, the UNcould perpetuate sanctions indefinitely. The actions ofMinister of Military Industrialization ‘Abd-al-TawabAl Mullah Huwaysh reflected this situation: he saidhe gave explicit directions to MIC leadership andworkforce to avoid any activities that would jeopardizelifting UN sanctions. But, according to reportsfrom his subordinates, he disregarded UN restrictions;acting, as if Saddam had instructed him to do so andjustifying his actions by telling his employees thatno matter how much evidence Iraq provided it wouldnever satisfy the UN. For example, Huwaysh authorizedin 2000 the repair of two 300-gallon mixers,and two solid propellant casting chambers in 2002(all rendered inoperable by UNSCOM inspectors in1992), for possible use in building solid propellantmissiles that exceeded the 150 km range restrictionfixed by UNSCR 687.While international sympathy for the plight of theIraqi people increased and support for sanctions progressivelyeroded, Saddam was unable to capitalizeon these shifting moods to strengthen his bargainingposition with the UN. Isolated internally by his paranoiaover personal security, and externally by hismisreading of international events, Saddam misseda major opportunity to reduce tensions with theUnited States following the 11 September 2001 terroristattacks. By failing to condemn the attacks andexpress sympathy to the American people, Saddamreinforced US suspicions about his connections to AlQa’ida and certified Iraq’s credentials as a rogue state.He told his ministers that after all the hardships theIraqi people had suffered under sanctions he could notextend official condolences to the United States, thegovernment most responsible for blocking sanctionsrelief. From a practical standpoint, Saddam probablyalso believed—mistakenly—that his behavior towardthe United States was of little consequence, as sanctionswere on the verge of collapse.Nullifying All Obligations To UNSC ResolutionsSaddam, angered by sanctions, inspections, and theDesert Fox attacks, unilaterally abrogated Iraq’scompliance with all UN resolutions—includingthe 1991 Gulf war ceasefire—with a secret RCCresolution, according to both presidential secretary‘Abd Hamid Mahmud and Diwan President AhmadHusayn Khudayr. Tension within the former Regimeover the inspections process had been building since1995, but Saddam did not formalize his decisionto cut Iraq free from UN-imposed limitations until1998. The RCC resolution was unique because ofits confidential nature, according to Ahmad Husayn.The RCC never repealed the resolution nor publishedit. The secret RCC resolution most likely represented—beyonda personal and impetuous swipeby Saddam at those he saw as his tormentors—anattempt by Saddam to create a legal foundation forfuture action, as well as preserve his standing inIraqi history.Regime StrategicIntent57