Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

• According to a high-level Iraqi civilian official withdirect access, the MoA took control of one of thefood testing labs, which was used to test SaddamHusayn’s food. Equipment for the lab was purchasedthrough the Iraqi–Jordanian Protocol. Dr.Sabah of the Veterinary College was instrumental inthese purchases (see Figure 50).The MoA also used the MIC to obtain goods thatwere deemed especially difficult to procure given therestrictions of UN sanctions. At the same time, theMIC would occasionally identify the MoA as a falseend user to obtain restricted dual-use goods.• Between 1992 and 1998, the MIC was responsiblefor all chemical procurement in Iraq. The MICbrought active ingredients into the country usingfalse bills of lading, formulated the product, andthen distributed the final product to the appropriateministry. For example, the MIC smuggled insecticides—probablyMalathion and Parathion—intoIraq, formulated them at Al-Tariq, and subsequentlyprovided them to the MoA.• In late 2002, the MIC and IIS directed Iraqi businessman,Sattan Al Ka’awd (who may also beknown as Sattam Al-Gaaod), to approach a Croatianengineer, Miroslav, and other Croatians to purchaserestricted precursor chemicals from Croatia.According to an Iraqi businessman with directaccess, Al Ka’awad was tasked for this activitydue to his close working relationship in the pastwith the Iraqi Government. The end user of thechemicals was reportedly the MoA but the actualrecipient was said to be involved in CW activities,according to the same source.Ministry of InteriorISG has not discovered evidence that the Ministryof Interior (MoI) was involved in the procurementof WMD materials, prohibited items, or dual-usegoods. This finding is consistent with the MoI internallyfocused mission. In addition, prior to OIF, theMoD not the MoI administratively controlled securitygroups that may have been involved in illicit procurementactivities.Front Company Conglomerates: Al-Eman andAl-HandalIn addition to the major front companies alreadymentioned in this report, the Iraqi Government andits citizens set up hundreds of other front companiesboth within the country and around the world forthe purpose of smuggling prohibited items into thecountry. We now know of over 230 of these frontcompanies, many of which were created for a singletransaction and never used again. There were, however,several major front companies that participatedin the majority of this illicit business, some of whichwere government-sponsored and one large conglomerate,Al-Eman, which was privately owned.The term “Iraqi front company” has become pervasivein terms of Iraq’s procurement networks. One definitionof an Iraqi front company is an Iraqi company orIraqi controlled company, operating either within Iraqor abroad that knowingly partakes in internationalcommerce with the intent to acquire goods or servicesfor an Iraqi client using deceptive trade practices.Deceptive practices could include misleading orcolluding with suppliers, intermediaries, or othersinvolved in the acquisition, shipping, or paymentprocesses. This would include such actions as misrepresentingthe origin or final destination of goods,or misidentifying the goods, the end user, or end use.Complicating matters, many of these companies wereinvolved in legitimate trade, with illicit activity playinga less significant role. The association of the IISwith a company also suggested Iraqi influence andfront activity.The assumption and general appearance was thatmany Iraqi companies involved in international trade,as a norm, were aware of deceptive trade channelsand took advantage of them in dealing with bothroutine and sensitive acquisitions. However, thegovernment’s association and influence with tradecompanies varied. Some companies may not havehad a choice, but others found it in their financialinterest to get involved, and therefore approachedand competed for government contracts.Al-Eman, directed by Sattam Hamid Farhan Al-Gaaod (see Figure 51) had its start in the early1990s, and up until OIF, was the largest network of86