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Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

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maker asserted that either country was an imminentchallenge between 1991 and 2003. Late during thisperiod, Saddam became concerned about the growingmilitary imbalance between Iran and <strong>Iraq</strong>; Iranwas making significant advances in WMD while <strong>Iraq</strong>was being deprived of the opportunity to maintain oradvance its WMD capacity. He also privately told histop advisors, on multiple occasions, that he sought toestablish a strategic balance between the Arabs andIsrael, a different objective from deterring an Iranianstrategic attack or blunting an Iranian invasion.• According to ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud, Saddam“desired for <strong>Iraq</strong> to possess WMD, nuclear, biological,and chemical because he always said thathe desired for balance in the Middle East region.”Saddam said this was because there were othercountries in the area that possessed such weapons,like Israel, and others on the way to possession, likeIran.IranSaddam believed that WMD was necessary to counterIran. He saw Iran as <strong>Iraq</strong>’s abiding enemy and hesought to keep it in check. Saddam was keenly awarethat, in addition to the potential of invasion, Iranianinfiltrators could cause internal unrest. Therefore, theorientation of most <strong>Iraq</strong>i ground forces toward theIranian border remained unchanged throughout thesanctions period. Saddam argued <strong>Iraq</strong>i WMD development,while driven in part by the growth of Iraniancapabilities, was also intended to provide <strong>Iraq</strong> with awinning edge against Iran.• Saddam considered WMD as the only sure counterbalanceto an enemy developing WMD of itsown. He said Iran was the main concern becauseit wanted to annex southern <strong>Iraq</strong>. Saddam said USair strikes were less of a worry than an Iranian landattack.• Ramadan thought WMD programs might only besuspended for a short period of time in order tonormalize <strong>Iraq</strong>’s relations with the internationalcommunity, and would have to be resumed if nosubstitute counterbalance to Iran was forthcoming.• Saddam and the Quartet discussed Iran many times,according to officials close to Saddam. Both ‘Azizand Huwaysh have stated in interviews that Saddam’smain focus was the danger from Iran.• Iran attacked a Mujahiddin è Khaliq (MEK) facilityin April 2001 with more than 60 missiles. Earlierstrikes on MEK targets had occurred in November1994 and June 1999, but Iran had only fired a smallnumber of rockets.Saddam was very concerned about Iranian militaryproduction capabilities, particularly its nuclearweapons program, according to former Vice PresidentRamadan. A Ministry of Defense conference concludedin January 2003 that Iranian WMD posed alooming menace to <strong>Iraq</strong> and the region, according toa sensitive source. Attended by 200 senior officers,the conference discussed Iran’s pursuit of nuclearweapons, acquisition of suitable delivery systems, andpossession of missiles capable of carrying CW or BWwarheads over a range of 1,000 kilometers. Saddambelieved that Iran had benefited from the breakup ofthe former Soviet Union by gaining access to WMDas well as conventional technologies.<strong>Iraq</strong>i military troops trained with the expectationthat Iran would use CW if Iran invaded. If <strong>Iraq</strong> cameunder chemical or biological attack, the army wouldattempt to survive until the international communityintervened. Tariq ‘Aziz also expressed hope that theclose UN monitoring of <strong>Iraq</strong> might force internationalintervention in this scenario. Saddam felt that theUnited States would intervene to protect oilfields,according to a former senior <strong>Iraq</strong>i official.A former Corps commander stated that Saddambelieved the next war would be fought in a chemicalenvironment with heavy reliance upon missiles. <strong>Iraq</strong>assumed that Iran could manufacture CW and woulduse it, according to a former senior <strong>Iraq</strong>i intelligenceofficer. The <strong>Iraq</strong>is had identified Iranian nuclear andchemical facilities as well as 240 factories in Iran thatthey assessed produced missile components.Between 1998 and 2003, <strong>Iraq</strong>i leaders determined thatTehran was more of a long-term danger than an imminentone because of deficiencies in Iranian readinessand morale when compared against <strong>Iraq</strong>i training andRegime StrategicIntent29

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