Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

ibility with UNSCOM. Iraqi demands to end sanctionsand threats to stop cooperation with UNSCOMbecame increasingly shrill in the two months prior toHusayn Kamil’s defection. Vice President Ramadansaid on 14 June that Iraq had decided “not to continuecooperation with the Council” if UNSCOM ExecutiveChairman Rolf Ekeus’ 19 June 1995 report to theSecurity Council did not bring about “a positive positionthat contributes to ending the siege imposed onIraq.” On 17 July, the anniversary of the Ba’th partyrevolution, Saddam again threatened to stop cooperationwith the UN unless sanctions were lifted. Twodays later, after meetings with his Egyptian counterpart,Iraqi Foreign Minister Muhammad Sa’id KazimAl Sahaf insisted that Iraq had complied with its obligationsunder UN resolutions and demanded the oilembargo and other sanctions be lifted by the SecurityCouncil after the next review on 14 September.By the time Husayn Kamil fled, Iraq already had submittedanother “full, final, and complete declaration(FFCD)” on its biological program to UNSCOM. On1 July 1995, Iraq had admitted to the production ofbulk biological agent, but had denied weaponizing it.To maintain the appearance of cooperation, however,Iraq had to provide more information to inspectorsand withdraw the earlier FFCD. After making suchstrident demands of Rolf Ekeus and the UN, Iraq wasnow forced—to great embarrassment—to withdrawits threat to cease cooperation with UNSCOM andadmit that its biological program was more extensivethan previously acknowledged.• Husayn Kamil’s flight set the stage for furtherdisclosures to the UN, particularly in the BW andnuclear fields. The UN responded by destroyingextensive dual-use facilities critical to the BWprogram, such as the facilities at Al Hakam andDawrah. The revelations also triggered contentiousUNSCOM inspections in 1996 designed to counterRegime deception efforts and led to showdownsover access to sensitive facilities, including presidentialsites.• After Husayn Kamil’s departure, about 500 scientistsand other nuclear officials assembled andsigned documents affirming they would hide neitherequipment nor documents, according to a formernuclear scientist.• The director of the National Monitoring Directorate(NMD) responded to Husayn Kamil’s departureby installing representatives in each ministry andcompany, according to the former Minister of MilitaryIndustrialization ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah AlMullah Huwaysh. These individuals, fully aware ofall the UNSC resolutions, were to report any violationsto the NMD. When they detected potentialviolations, such as trying to procure materials andconducting illicit research, they halted them.Cooperating With UNSCOM While PreservingWMDIraq attempted to balance competing desires toappear to cooperate with the UN and have sanctionslifted, and to preserve the ability to eventually reconstituteits weapons of mass destruction. Iraqi behaviorunder sanctions reflects the interplay betweenSaddam’s perceived requirements for WMD and hisconfidence in the Regime’s ability to ride out inspectionswithout full compliance, and the perceived costsand longevity of sanctions. The Iraqis never got thebalance right.• According to ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud, Saddamprivately told him that Iraq would reacquire WMDpost-sanctions and that he was concerned aboutIraq’s vulnerability to Israeli WMD and Iran’sgrowing nuclear threat.• Baghdad tried to balance perceived opportunitiesoffered by denial and deception, and diplomacy,against costs imposed by the continuation ofsanctions, the UN’s introduction of more rigorousinspection techniques, and Coalition air attacks.• Saddam repeatedly told his ministers not to participatein WMD-related activity, according to Tariq‘Aziz.• A former MIC employee stated he was directed tosign an affidavit in 1993 acknowledging he understoodthat he was under orders to comply with UNrestrictions and that the penalty for non-compliancewas death. He signed a similar affidavit in 1994-Regime StrategicIntent47