Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Husayn Kamil (continued)to return to Iraq in February 1996, supposedly withthe promise of a pardon from Saddam. Upon theirreturn from Jordan, he and his brother were detained,separated from their families, and placed under housearrest. Within days, Saddam’s daughters divorcedtheir husbands. While under house arrest HusaynKamil and his brother were confronted by ‘Ali HasanAl Majid and members of their family tribe, come toreclaim “tribal honor.” Husayn Kamil, his brother• The Surface-to-Surface Missile Command concealedundeclared Al Husayn and Scud missiles,launchers, and chemical and biological warheads.• Particularly in the early 1990s, the SRG concealeduranium enrichment equipment, missiles, missilemanufacturing equipment, “know-how” documentsfrom all the programs, as well as a supply of strategicmaterials.• The RG Security Directorate of the SSO conveyedinstruction from Husayn Kamil and Qusay to theSRG elements that were hiding material and documents,and SSO political officers at SRG units oftenknew the whereabouts of the hidden material.Senior Regime members failed to anticipate the durationof sanctions and the rigor of UN inspections.• Saddam initially expected the sanctions wouldlast no more than three years, and many Iraqisdoubted the sanctions would be so comprehensive,according to several detainee interviews. Theseperceptions probably persuaded senior Regimeleaders that they could weather a short-lived sanctionsregime by making limited concessions, hidingmuch of their pre-existing weapons and documentation,and even expanding biological warfare potentialby enhancing dual-use facilities.Saddam, their father, their sister and her childrenwere killed in the ensuing shoot-out. Saddam Husayn“explicitly endorsed the killings, which, as he sawthem, ‘purifi ed’ and healed the family by amputatingfrom the ‘hand’ an ‘ailing fi nger.’” Trying at thesame time to distance himself, however, he assuredhis listeners that, had he been notified about it aheadof time, he would have prevented the assault, because“when I pardon, I mean it.”• Following unexpectedly thorough inspections,Saddam ordered Husayn Kamil in July 1991 todestroy unilaterally large numbers of undeclaredweapons and related materials to conceal Iraq’sWMD capabilities. This destruction–and Iraq’sfailure to document the destruction–greatly complicatedUN verification efforts and thereby prolongedUN economic sanctions on Iraq. Accordingto Iraqi Presidential Advisor ‘Amir Hamudi HasanAl Sa’adi, the unilateral destruction decision wascomparable in its negative consequences for Iraqwith the decision to invade Kuwait.• Intrusive inspections also affected potential WMDprograms by guaranteeing the presence of inspectionteams in Iraqi military, and research and developmentfacilities.• Sanctions imposed constraints on potential WMDprograms through limitations on resources andrestraints on imports. The sanctions forced Iraq toslash funding that might have been used to refurbishthe military establishment and complicated theimport of military goods. Rebuilding the military,including any WMD capability, required an end tosanctions.• The economic bite of the sanctions instead grewincreasingly painful and forced the Regime to adoptan unprecedented range of austerity measures by1996. Disclosure of new evidence of Iraqi WMDactivity following Husayn Kamil’s 1995 flight toJordan undermined Baghdad’s case before the UN.Husayn Kamil’s DepartureSenior Iraqi officials—especially Saddam—werecaught off-guard by Husayn Kamil’s flight to Jordanin August 1995. The Regime was forced to quicklyassess what the fallout would be from any revelationsand what damage they would inflict on Iraqi cred-46