Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

tion Plan approved under UNSCR 715—and one Iraqhad refused to pass despite UN requests since 1991.On 14 February 2003, Saddam issued a presidentialdirective prohibiting private sector companies andindividuals from importing or producing biological,chemical, and nuclear weapons or material, accordingto documentary evidence. The directive did not mentiongovernment organizations.Iraq’s Other Security ConcernsIraq engaged in denial and deception activities tosafeguard national security and Saddam’s positionin the Regime. These surveillance activities and thesuspect vehicle movements in and around sensitivesites made it difficult for Western intelligence servicesto distinguish innoculous security-related measuresfrom WMD concealment activities which added to thesuspicion of Iraqi actions.• According to a former senior SSO officer, prior toany UN inspection visits, the SSO leadership wouldinstruct the chiefs of each SSO directorate to concealanything to do with the President or his family,any documents referring to the Scientific Directorate,documents pertaining to human rights violations,documents pertaining to prisoners in custody,and photos of senior Regime personnel.• The IIS was determined not to allow UN inspectionteams to gather intelligence at sensitive sites, whichthe Iraqis feared had been done in the past. Membersof the Directorate of Counterintelligence (M5)heightened their physical observation of UN personnelduring site visits to prevent this, accordingto sensitive reporting from a source with excellentaccess.• Huwaysh instructed MIC general directors toconceal sensitive material and documents fromUN inspectors. This was done to prevent inspectorsfrom discovering numerous purchases of illicitconventional weapons and military equipment fromfirms in Russia, Belarus, and the Former Republicof Yugoslavia.• Saddam was convinced that the UN inspectorscould pinpoint his exact location, allowing USwarplanes to bomb him, according to a formerhigh-level Iraqi Government official. As a result,in late 1998 when inspectors visited a Ba’th PartyHeadquarters, Saddam issued orders not to givethem access. Saddam did this to prevent the inspectorsfrom knowing his whereabouts, not because hehad something to hide, according to the source.In order to preserve his dignity and security, Saddamwanted to ensure that he had absolutely no contactwith UNMOVIC inspectors. SSO “minders”used radios to alert Saddam’s security personnel ofUNMOVIC’s actions so he could avoid contact withinspectors. According to a former senior Iraqi official,on one occasion when inspectors arrived at a presidentialsite, Saddam left through the back gate.Sorting Out Whether Iraq Had WMD BeforeOperation Iraqi FreedomISG has not found evidence that Saddam Husaynpossessed WMD stocks in 2003, but the availableevidence from its investigation—including detaineeinterviews and document exploitation—leaves openthe possibility that some weapons existed in Iraqalthough not of a militarily significant capability.Several senior officers asserted that if Saddam hadWMD available when the 2003 war began, he wouldhave used them to avoid being overrun by Coalitionforces.• ‘Amir Hamudi Hasan Al Sa’adi told an emissaryfrom the RG leadership, on 27 January 2003, thatif Saddam had WMD, he would use it, according toa former officer with direct knowledge of Iraqi militaryground operations and planning.• According to a former senior RG official, Iraq haddismantled or destroyed all of its WMD assets andmanufacturing facilities. Had Saddam possessedWMD assets, he would have used them to counterthe Coalition invasion.• If he had CW, Saddam would have used it againstCoalition Forces to save the Regime, according to aformer senior official.• Iraqi military planning did not incorporate theuse—or even the threat of use—of WMD after1991, according to ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid. WMD was64