Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

VX Warhead Samples & The Iraqi Air ForceDocument Story (continued)copy. The chief inspector objected to these restrictionsafter which Iraqi offi cials seized the document fromthe chief inspector’s hands and refused UNSCOMany further access to the papers. According to Amin,Iraq considered any documentation or discussionsdetailing the use of chemical weapons to be a redlineissue. Iraq did not want to declare anything thatdocumented use of chemical weapons for fear thedocumentation could be used against Iraq in lawsuits.Iraqi Regime leadership was concerned Iran wouldseek legal reparations for the death and suffering ofIranian citizens due to Iraq’s use of CW in the 1980s.From 1998 until 2003, Iraq was unwilling to handover the Air Force document. According to Tariq‘Aziz, “In most cases Saddam listened and agreedwith me when I would tell him that we must beforthcoming with the UN.” However, ‘Aziz added,“The Higher Committee did not want to release thedocument to the UN because the delivery times andmethods contained in the document were thought tobe sensitive.” When pressed further on why the Iraqiswere so adamant about maintaining the Air Forcedocument ‘Aziz paused, then stated, “We did not haveto hand over the document because it was a matter ofour national security.”Regime StrategicIntentin 2002. This role prompted MIC to undertake aninternal deception campaign to withhold informationregarding the procurement of dual-use materialfrom the NMD, which was viewed as an obstacle toMIC progress.• MIC employees in 1999 had to sign an affidavitstating that they would not import restrictedmaterials or withhold documents, according to aformer senior Iraqi officer who worked in MIC.The Minister of Military Industrialization claimedthat although he prohibited any research that wouldviolate UN sanctions, some scientists conductedresearch in secret. The deputy of NMD requestedscientists to turn in documents that might be storedin their home in 2001, according to a sensitivesource.Suspending Cooperation With UNSCOMThe tension that had built between Iraq andUNSCOM over 1997 began to ease in 1998 withUN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s visit in Februaryand the subsequent draft of a Memorandumof Understanding that restricted the criteria forpresidential site visits. A month later, the UNSCdecided to review the status of sanctions every sixtydays, giving the former Regime hope that the endof sanctions was nearing. These two concessions toIraq calmed the situation and gave the appearancethat things were moving forward. Over the summerof 1998, however, pressure on Iraq began to buildagain as the VX findings leaked in June, and the AirForce document was discovered in July. Tariq ‘Aziz,in a carefully scripted early August performance,demanded that UNSCOM Executive Chairman RichardButler report to the Security Council that Iraq hadmet its disarmament obligation, but Butler refused todo so.UNSCOM and the IAEA failed to close any of theoutstanding WMD case files during the summerof 1998—despite high Iraqi hopes to the contrary.Saddam’s profound sensitivity over palace inspectionsand growing Iraqi bitterness about prolonged cooperationwith the UN without getting anything in returnalso complicated Iraqi-UN relations. These events createdbreakdowns in the process that probably wouldhave occurred whether or not Iraq retained WMD.Saddam, Tariq ‘Aziz, and other senior Regimeofficials realized by August 1998 that Iraq would notbe able to satisfy UNSCOM and the UN SecurityCouncil and have sanctions lifted. This led Saddamto suspend cooperation with UNSCOM and theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 5August and to halt all UNSCOM activities in Iraq,55