Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

solely for civilian use when the reality was theywere dual use facilities, according to the formerpresidential secretary, ‘Abd.• Husayn Kamil masterminded the undeclareddestruction of large stocks of WMD in July 1991.This undermined Iraq’s and specifically Tariq‘Aziz’s credibility with the UN. Husayn Kamil alsopersuaded Saddam to hide and to deny the existenceof Iraq’s nuclear program in 1991, conceal thebiological weapons program, and to reject early UNoffers (UNSCR 712, a forerunner to the OFF program)of monitored oil sales as a means of limitedsanctions relief.• Tariq ‘Aziz said that in contrast he sought concessionsfrom the UN in return for Iraq’s gradual compliancewith UN sanctions. He cooperated with theUN, but was undercut by Husayn Kamil’s machinationsand was unable to extract concessions, anoutcome that eventually led Saddam and other leadersto criticize him, according to the presidentialsecretary.Ibrahim al Duri served as the informal chair andTariq ‘Aziz, Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan and‘Ali Hasan Al Majid, who was put on the committeeto monitor the others, served as members. Saddamset the agenda, which was ad hoc and varied. TheQuartet might consider WMD-related topics such asUNSCOM cooperation, but it did not address overallstrategy for acquiring or employing WMD, accordingto Tariq ‘Aziz.Neither the Political Operations Room nor theQuartet had a policymaking role. Instead, theyoffered advice, but only on issues referred to them bySaddam. They had none of the proactive or directivepowers normally associated with such senior committeesin the West or elsewhere. Moreover, they wereweakened by the Byzantine administrative practicescommon to the higher levels of the Regime.• The Quartet addressed an extensive range of topics,including policies toward Russia, France, Syria, theUN and the Kurds. It also discussed the Arab-Israelisituation and the dispatch of envoys. ‘Izzat Ibrahimwould prepare a few working minutes, uncoordinatedwith any of the other members, after themeeting and forward them to Saddam.Regime StrategicIntentThe Foreign Policy CommitteesSaddam created a committee called the PoliticalOperations Room after 1991 as a deliberative bodyto provide political advice. The committee, comprisingForeign Minister Ahmad Husayn Khudayr AlSamarra’i, Prime Minister Sa’dun Hamadi (chair),Tariq ‘Aziz and either Latif Nusayyif Jasim AlDulaymi or Hamid Yusif Hammadi, replaced a systemin which ministers met with Saddam individually todiscuss such issues. Tariq ‘Aziz was assigned to chairthe committee when Saddam fired Hamid in October1991.• Important decisions were left to Saddam, althoughthe committee sought to react quickly to secondarypolitical developments by issuing statements andcomments according to Tariq ‘Aziz.Saddam created the Committee of Four, or Quartet,in 1996 as a foreign policy advisory body to replacethe Political Operations Room. Vice President ‘Izzat• The Quartet assigned specific government agenciesto research specific topics and provide answersto Saddam, if the president required it, but did nothave a dedicated assessments staff of its own.The RCC also considered foreign policy issues butusually in the form of briefings from Saddam orexpert staff and usually did little more than endorsethe decision Saddam had already determined. Itserved increasingly as a forum for Saddam to makeannouncements or as a face-saving foil to explainIraq’s policy changes.• Saddam would on occasion elicit foreign policyadvice from the RCC, but would not accept it veryoften, even after lengthy discussion, according toformer Vice President Ramadan. The RCC at othertimes would simply parrot what they knew wasSaddam’s opinion. Saddam was more inclined toaccept RCC advice about more junior level governmentappointments.15