Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Renewing UN InspectionsIraq allowed the IAEA and UNMOVIC to resumeinspections in November 2002 in the face of growinginternational pressure while apparently calculating asurge of cooperation might bring sanctions to an end.• As it was during the period of the UNSCOMinspections, the Higher Committee was re-establishedin 2002, this time headed by Vice-PresidentRamadan, in order to prepare for the UNMOVICmissions. According to Tariq ‘Aziz, Saddambelieved that the goal of these inspections was todeprive Iraq of any scientific, chemical or advancedtechnology. Saddam said, “These people are playinga game with us—we’ll play a game with them.”• Saddam assembled senior officials in December2002 and directed them to cooperate completelywith inspectors, according to a former seniorofficer. Saddam stated that the UN would submita report on 27 January 2003, and that this reportwould indicate that Iraq was cooperating fully.He stated that all Iraqi organizations should openthemselves entirely to UNMOVIC inspectors. TheRepublican Guard should make all records andeven battle plans available to inspectors, if theyrequested. The Guard was to be prepared to havean “open house” day or night for the UNMOVICinspectors. Husam Amin met with military leadersagain on 20 January 2003 and conveyed the samedirectives. During this timeframe Russia and Francewere also encouraging Saddam to accept UN resolutionsand to allow inspections without hinderingthem.• The Higher Committee gradually addressed UNconcerns as Ramadan relaxed Baghdad’s originalopposition to the UN resuming U-2 flights andconducting private, unmonitored interviews withIraqi scientists. These actions eliminated majorstumbling blocks in potential Iraqi cooperation withUNMOVIC.• Saddam hoped to get sanctions lifted in return forhosting a set of UN inspections that found no evidenceof WMD, according to statements ascribedto him by a former senior officer. The governmentdirected key military units to conduct specialinspections to ensure they possessed no WMDassociatedequipment.• Upon the direction of UNMOVIC, Baghdad starteddestroying its al Samud II ballistic missiles 1 March2003 despite disagreements over the actual operationalrange of the missile.• Beginning on 27 November 2002 until UnitedNations withdrew all its personnel on 18 March2003, UNMOVIC completed 731 inspections at 411sites, including 88 sites it had visited for the firsttime.• The NMD published the Currently Accurate, Full,and Complete Declaration on 7 December 2002,and it attempted to resolve the pending issues ofthe UN’s Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq’sProscribed Weapons Programmes until the beginningof the war.Iraqi military industries several times required scientiststo sign statements acknowledging the prohibitionon conducting WMD research. At a minimum,the forms would have provided documents to offerthe UN, but they may also have stopped “free lancing”and thereby ensured that any WMD researchunderway was tightly controlled to avoid inadvertentdisclosures.• MIC on 20 January 2003 ordered the general directorsof its companies to relinquish all WMD to theNMD and threatened severe penalties against thosewho failed to comply, according to documentaryevidence.• The NMD director met with Republican Guardmilitary leaders on 25 January 2003 and advisedthem they were to sign documents saying that therewas no WMD in their units, according to a formerIraqi senior officer. Husam Amin told them thatthe government would hold them responsible ifUNMOVIC found any WMD in their units or areas,or if there was anything that cast doubt on Iraq’scooperation with UNMOVIC. Commanders establishedcommittees to ensure their units retained noevidence of old WMD.Iraq’s National Assembly passed a law banningWMD, a measure that had been required underparagraph 23 of the Ongoing Monitoring and Verifica-Regime StrategicIntent63