Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

• Taleb Uwayn Al-Juma’a, the Chief of the Directorateof Weapons and Supplies, usually served as theMoD delegate for these visits. When accompanyingthe MIC abroad Uwayn was subordinated to theMIC leadership.• The only time MoD procurement was not coordinatedby the MIC was when the Minister ofDefense or his Chief of Staff headed the Iraqidelegations.Figure 37. Ministry of Defense leadership hierarchy(from 1997 to 2003).• According to Al-Ta’i, the MIC was responsible for95 to 99 percent of MoD procurement. Data fromthe Syrian trade protocols; however, indicate thatthis percentage was probably closer to 70 percent.In any case, the MIC negotiated contracts, identifiedforeign and domestic sources for prohibiteditems (often via its front companies), and arrangedthe delivery of goods for the MoD.• After 1997, Al-Ta’i dealt directly with the head ofthe MIC, Abd al-Tawab Mullah Huwaysh, and histwo deputies, Dagher Muhammad Mahmud andMuzahim Sa’ab Al-Hasan, on substantive procurementissues.• The Directorate of Weapons and Supplies coordinatedwith the MIC on MoD procurement projectsvia regular meetings. These meetings addressed arange of day-to-day procurement issues, includingthe mechanics of requesting and deliveringitems, financing procurement contracts, addressingcomplaints over late deliveries, and adjudicatingproblems related to poor quality equipment.According to Al-Ta’i, the Directorate of Weaponsand Supplies participated in several MIC-coordinateddefense procurement delegations each year,providing expertise in weapons pricing and howforeign systems could best improve Iraq’s defensecapabilities.• When Iraq hosted these delegations, the MIC handled,negotiated, and signed procurement contractson behalf of the MoD.• Uwayn developed some overseas procurement contactsfrom MIC sponsored travel to Yugoslavia andRussia. Uwayn also traveled to Syria two or threetimes, on one occasion with Huwaysh.Budgeting and Financing Military ProcurementAs with the other Iraqi ministries, the MoD operatedtwo budgetary processes: one deliberate and the othersupplemental. The formal MoD budget was small,preplanned, and approved via a deliberative processinvolving multiple ministries and commissions. TheMoD’s formal budget was used to purchase non-sanctioneditems and fund the basic operation of the force.• According to data from a captured general governmentbudget document, containing only operatingexpenditures, Iraqi defense spending was $124.7million in 2002. This figure, however, does notrepresent true Iraqi defense spending, as the formerRegime did not list defense spending in its generalbudget during the 1990-2003 sanctions Regime.In sharp contrast to the MoD’s formal budget,the supplemental MoD budget was controlled bySaddam and was used for illicit procurement ofprohibited items.• Typically, Iraqi military units identified requirementsand forwarded them up the chain of the commandto the directorate head.• The director reviewed and forward procurementrequirements to the Chief or Deputy Chief of Staffwho would review the procurement recommendationsand forward them to them to the Minister ofDefense, Al-Ta’i.62