Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

of it borrowed from Gulf neighbors and the SovietUnion (for arms). Having survived, Saddam learnedthat defeating superior numbers of Iranian forces,especially massed infantry attacks, required the useof CW. He was also convinced that Iraq’s ability toretaliate with missile strikes against Tehran in the1988 “War of the Cities” finally forced Khomeini toagree to a ceasefire. The importance of a mutuallysupporting system of WMD, with theater ballisticmissiles in securing Iraq’s national security becamean article of faith for Saddam and the vast majorityof Regime members.Despite Iraq’s heavy burden of debt after the war,Saddam emerged with an experienced and expandedmilitary force, poised to dominate the Gulf. Economicdifficulties were Saddam’s main motive forthe invasion of Kuwait, with irredentist grievances asecondary concern. Absorbing Kuwait as Iraq’s 19 thprovince was viewed as having historical justificationand being the key to revitalizing Iraq’s economy.Saddam had planned for an invasion of Kuwait forsome weeks beforehand, but the timeframe in whichto conduct the attack had not been formalized. Theimpulsive decision to invade in August 1990 wasprecipitated by what Saddam chose to perceive asKuwait’s arrogance in negotiations over disputed oildrilling along the common border.As in the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam’s ambition led him tomiscalculate the impact of his actions. He was unpreparedfor the harsh reaction to the Kuwaiti invasionby the United States and the other permanent membersof the UNSC, especially the Soviet Union, andsurprised by the condemnation of fellow Arab leaders,many of whom he knew detested the Kuwaitis. In theface of this criticism, however, Saddam refused toback down, believing he could prevail, just as he didagainst Iran. While Coalition forces ousted Iraq fromKuwait, Saddam maintained his grip on power insideIraq, as well as his conviction that the key to successfullydefending Iraq was to possess WMD and aneffective means of delivering them.Decline (1991-1996)The costliness of the Iran/Iraq war and the resultinginvasion of Kuwait ushered in a period of economicand military decline. The years 1991—1996 werea tense and difficult period that threatened Regimesurvival. The Iraqi economy hit rock bottom in 1995and forced Saddam to accept the OFF program thefollowing year; bolstering the position of the Regimegenerally and Saddam’s survival specifically.UNSCR 715, passed on 11 October 1991, requiredIraq’s unconditional acceptance of an ongoingmonitoring and verification presence to verify Iraq’scompliance with the weapons-related provisionsof UNSCR 687 (1991). UNSCR 715 also requirednational implementing legislation to ban future IraqiWMD work. The former Regime refused to acceptthese provisions until November 1993. (However,national implementing legislation was not enacteduntil February 2003.) The former Regime objectedto the open-ended nature of long-term monitoring,because Iraq equated the presence of inspectorswith the continuation of sanctions. As this wranglingcontinued, sanctions took their toll on the Iraqieconomy—government and private-sector revenuescollapsed, rampant inflation undermined businessconfidence, and Iraqis at all levels were impoverished—andthe former Regime in late 1994 threatenedto end cooperation with inspectors unless the oilembargo was lifted. The Iraqi Government was unableto invest in rebuilding its infrastructure, already devastatedby the Gulf war and the Iran-Iraq war.The “no-fly zones” over northern and southern Iraq,patrolled by Coalition aircraft, were an affront to Iraqisovereignty. Although severely weakened militarily,Iraq used troop movements into southern Iraqin 1994 to threaten the Kuwaitis and into northernIraq in 1996 to punish disaffected Kurds. Internally,the departure to Jordan in August 1995 of Saddam’sson-in-law and close confidante Husayn Kamil createdfurther disarray among senior members of theIraqi Regime. Through it all, Saddam endured and hisdesire to end sanctions and rebuild his WMD capabilitypersisted.42