Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

including monitoring, on 31 October. Even thoughSaddam revoked this decision on 14 November(under the threat of an American air strike), it hadso poisoned the atmosphere with UNSCOM that therelationship could not be repaired. UNSCOM inspectorsreturned in November and December 1998, but ina letter to the UN Secretary General on 15 December,UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler notedthat “Iraq’s conduct ensured that no progress wasable to be made in either the fields of disarmament oraccounting for its prohibited weapons programmes.”Iraqi behavior, the VX detection, the Air Force documentand other indications all conspired to eliminateany UN acceptance of imperfect compliance. Laterthat day UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors withdrewfrom Iraq; in the early morning hours of 16 Decemberthe Coalition launched a four-day bombing campaignagainst Iraq designated Desert Fox. On 19 December,Baghdad declared that UNSCOM would never beallowed to return to Iraq.Transition (1998-2001)The suspension of cooperation with UN inspectorsushered in a period of mixed fortunes for theRegime. This transitional phase was characterized byeconomic growth on the one hand, which emboldenedand accelerated illicit procurement and programs.On the other hand Saddam’s increasing physicalreclusiveness and the nature of the revenue streamsweakened the routine functioning of the Regime andits governance structures.At the conclusion of Desert Fox on 19 December1998, Vice President Ramadan announced the endof Iraq’s cooperation with UNSCOM at a pressconference in Baghdad. He declared, “The issue ofUNSCOM is behind us now. The commission of spiesis behind us now. It no longer has a task . . . all thathas to do with inspection, monitoring, and weaponsof mass destruction is now behind us.” The SecurityCouncil, however, created three panels on 30 January1999 under the direction of Brazilian AmbassadorCelso L.N. Amorim to re-start the process of inspections.The panel on Disarmament and Current andFuture Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Issuesreported its results on 27 March 1999 and recommendedto the Security Council that it create a newmonitoring and verification apparatus, within theexisting framework of UNSC resolutions, to replaceUNSCOM and tackle remaining Iraqi disarmamentissues. Iraq’s agreement to inspections, however, wasstill needed for a successful effort. The recommendationsfrom the panels formed the basis of UNSCR1284, ratified on 17 December 1999. Resolution1284’s first priority was the establishment of theUN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission(UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM. TheSecurity Council in January 2000 appointed HansBlix as UNMOVIC’s Executive Chairman. ObtainingIraq’s cooperation with UNMOVIC so inspectorscould return, however, took nearly three more years.Resolution 1284 also included language at Russia’sinsistence that obligated the Security Council to considerlifting economic sanctions. UNSCR 1284 alsoprovided the background to Iraq’s failure to acceptrenewed inspections from 2000 to late 2002.Despite the end of the former Regime’s cooperationwith UNSCOM, the OFF program continuedwithout interruption. The Security Council not onlyrenewed the original OFF mandate under UNSCR986, but raised the revenue ceiling for Iraqi oilexports in October 1999 with UNSCR 1266. The ceilingwas then eliminated with UNSCR 1284 (althoughthe resolution reaffirmed sanctions). While the formerRegime managed to collect significant hard currencyrevenues by illicitly exploiting the OFF contractingprocess, Saddam chafed under OFF controls, even asbenefits to the Iraqi people increased and the SecurityCouncil raised oil production ceilings. On 17 July1999, in a speech commemorating the 31 st anniversaryof the Ba’thist revolution in Iraq, Saddam stated,“Arab oil must be for the Arabs. It has become clearnow that the oil is for foreigners . . . . The UnitedStates determines the amounts and prices of oil, withthe help of its fleets and the occupation forces . . .in the Arabian Gulf countries [and is] now dictatingto others what they should sell or manufacture, thegoods and commodities they purchase, how much andhow many. Such a situation makes economic progressan unattainable wish in our greater Arab homeland.”The former Regime attempted to use Iraq’s oilresources to leverage the world community, andfrom 1999 to 2001 repeatedly—but with varying56