Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

The Saga of the “Chicken Farm” Documents (continued)Husam Amin was able to reach Ekeus about one hourprior to Ekeus’ scheduled departure from Baghdad.Ekeus, along with the IAEA’s Gary Dillon, set off forHusayn Kamil’s farm, guided by two minders sent bythe presidential secretary.Reportedly, the original plan for the documents wasto burn them all, and Walid and his crew had begunthat process at the farm in ‘Aqarquf. Then someonehad the “bright idea” to incriminate Husayn Kamilin the concealment of the documents, so they tookthe materials to his “chicken farm.” When inspectorsexamined the material at the farm, they noticedthe presence of pebbles among the dust on top ofthe document boxes, as though someone had simplythrown dirt on top of the boxes in an attempt to makeit appear that the boxes had been at the farm for along time. When the UN began an inquiry into howthe documents were discovered at the farm, the Iraqisproduced several fanciful stories that quicklyunraveled.Regime StrategicIntent• Saddam had said that after sanctions Iraq wouldresume production of WMD to “achieve internationalbalance and protect the dignity of Iraq andIraqis and the Arab nations,” according to formerpresidential secretary ‘Abd. ‘Abd wrote while adetainee, “He [Saddam] would say if only Iraqpossessed the nuclear weapon then no one wouldcommit acts of aggression on it or any other Arabcountry, and the Palestinian issue would be solvedpeacefully because of Iraq.”• Saddam would have restarted WMD programs,beginning with the nuclear program, after sanctions,according to Tariq ‘Aziz. Saddam never formallystated this intention, according to ‘Aziz, but he didnot believe other countries in the region shouldbe able to have WMD when Iraq could not. ‘Azizassessed that Iraq could have a WMD capabilitywithin two years of the end of sanctions.• Saddam’s intent to maintain and compartmentWMD capabilities was well known and oftenacknowledged by high level authorities, accordingto a senior Al Kindi State Company official. TheMinister of Military Industrialization allegedly toldthe source that Saddam wanted a WMD program“on the shelf.” Huwaysh, in a written statement,explained instead that Saddam briefed seniorofficials on several occasions saying, “We do notintend or aspire to return to our previous programsto produce WMD, if the Security Council abidesby its obligations pertaining to these resolutions[UNSCR 687, paragraph 14].” Saddam reiteratedthis point in a cabinet meeting in 2002, accordingto Dr. Humam ‘Abd-al-Khaliq ‘Abd-al Ghafur, theformer Minister of Higher Education and ScientificResearch.• Huwaysh believed that Saddam would base hisdecision regarding future Iraqi WMD developmenton how the Security Council followed through onits promise in paragraph 14 to establish “in theMiddle East a zone free from weapons of massdestruction and all missiles for their delivery.” Ifthis promise was not fulfilled, Iraq should be freeto act in its own interests. During an earlier debriefHuwaysh speculated that Iraq would have reconstitutedmany of its proscribed programs within fiveyears if OIF had not occurred.• During a custodial interview, Saddam, when askedwhether he would reconstitute WMD programsafter sanctions were lifted, implied that Iraq wouldhave done what was necessary.Guarding WMD CapabilitiesThe abortive efforts to outwardly comply with theUN inspection process from 1995 onward slowlyshifted to increased efforts to minimize the impactof the inspection process on Regime security,military, and industrial and research capabilities.Throughout 1997-1998, Iraq continued efforts tohinder UNSCOM inspections through site sanitization,warning inspection sites prior to the inspectors’arrival, concealment of sensitive documentation, andintelligence collection on the UN mission.• Increasingly after September 1997, Iraq burneddocuments, barred access to sites to UNSCOM,banned US inspectors, and threatened to shootdown UNSCOM U-2 missions until the UN forcedcompliance in November of the same year.51