Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

to consist of was hazy. His drive to preserve his placein Iraqi history outweighed even his feelings towardhis family. Saddam wanted a dynasty as seeminglythe best way to guarantee his legacy, but he was clearabout the distinction between dynasty and legacyand of the two, he was most concerned about legacy.At the time of the fall of the Regime, he was leaningtoward Qusay as successor, but with his second sonstill very much on probation.• A US interviewer noted Saddam spoke of his placein Iraqi history and his family in the same context,but showed a far greater concern for the former.• ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwayshthought Saddam saw himself in “larger than life”terms comparable to Nebuchadnezzar and Salahal-Din[Saladin]. More modestly, Saddam whenspeaking to ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid compared his ruleto Al Mansur, the Abbasid Caliph who foundedBaghdad, and Al Hajjaj, the Umayyad founderof Arab rule in Iraq. ‘Ali also thought Saddam“dreamed of making Iraq the biggest power in theregion and the Middle East.”• According to Huwaysh, Saddam’s economic visionfor Iraq—looking out ten years—was a recreationof Iraq’s industrial strength and a planned manufacturingeconomy that would not be dependent onoil exports. Saddam, however, had no plans for aninformation-based or service sector economy, norwas there a place for tourism. The likelihood wasthat even with peace and no sanctions, Iraq wouldhave been as self-isolated and unconnected to a freeworld as it ever had been under his rule.Desire . . . Dominance andDeterrence Through WMDSaddam’s Role in WMD PolicySaddam’s centrality to the Regime’s political structuremeant that he was the hub of Iraqi WMDpolicy and intent. His personalized and intricateadministrative methods meant that control of WMDdevelopment and its deployment was never far fromhis touch (see the “Excerpts from a Closed-DoorMeeting” inset). His chain of command for WMDwas optimized for his control rather than to ensure theparticipation of Iraq’s normal political, administrativeor military structures. Under this arrangement, theabsence of information about WMD in routine structuresand the Iraqi military’s order of battle would notmean it did not exist. Even so, if WMD existed, itsabsence from Iraqi military formations and planningwhen war was imminent in 2003 would be hard toexplain.As with past use, Saddam would have rigorously andpersonally controlled the relevant formations, andhave had sole release authority. Saddam’s doctrine inthe Iran-Iraq war was to separate WMD control fromthe military’s leadership, but to have its use available(and controlled by security agencies) if militaryoperations required it.The defense ministry and the senior military staffsformulated national war plans, but according to StaffGen. Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al Ta’i, the former Ministerof Defense, these organizations did not incorporateWMD in their planning, training, and supplysystems during the Iran-Iraq war. Sultan’s recollection,however seems thin given the likely degree ofplanning and training necessary for the extensive useof CW by both sides during the conflict.• During and after the late 1990s, the few timesSaddam evidently asked about the potential ofcertain Iraqi WMD options suggest he was notconsistently focused on this issue. He asked ad hocquestions about feasibility of reconstituting programsand confined his confidences to hinting thatIraq might reconstitute WMD after sanctions. WhileRegime StrategicIntent23