Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

• Saddam stated to his ministers that he did notconsider ballistic missiles to be WMD, accordingto Huwaysh. Saddam had never accepted missilerange restrictions and assessed that if he couldconvince the UN inspectors he was in complianceregarding nuclear, chemical and biological weaponsthen he could negotiate with the UNSC over missileranges.• Saddam stated publicly in early 2001 that “we arenot at all seeking to build up weapons or look forthe most harmful weapons . . . however, we willnever hesitate to possess the weapons to defend Iraqand the Arab nation”.• Purported design work done in 2000 on ballisticand land attack cruise missiles with ranges extendingto 1000 km suggests interest in long-rangedelivery systems.• In 2002, Iraq began serial production of the AlSamud II, a short-range ballistic missile that violatedUN range limits—text firings had reached 183km—and exceeded UN prescribed diameter limitationsof 600mm. Iraq’s production of 76 al SamudIIs, even under sanctions conditions, illustrates thatIraq sought more than a handful of ballistic missiles,but was deterred by the existing trade restrictions.• Saddam directed design and production of a 650 to750 km range missile in early 2002, according toHuwaysh. Saddam wanted the missile within halfa year. Huwaysh informed him, later that year, thatDr. Muzhir Sadiq Saba’ Al Tamimi’s twin Volgaengine, liquid-propellant design would reach only550 km and would take three to five years to produce.Saddam seemed profoundly disappointed, leftthe room without comment, and never raised thesubject again.• Other reports suggest work on a ballistic missiledesigned to exceed UN restrictions began earlier.A high-level missile official of Al Karamahh StateCompany said that in 1997 Huwaysh requestedhim to convert a Volga (SA-2) air defense missileinto a surface-to-surface missile. When the officialbriefed Huwaysh on the results, however, he saidHuwaysh told him to stop work immediately anddestroy all documentary evidence of the tests. Inmid-1998, another missile official said Huwayshordered ‘Abd-al-Baqi Rashid Shi’a, general directorat the Al Rashid State Company to developa solid-propellant missile capable of a range of1,000 to 1,200 km. The missile official speculatedHuwaysh’s order came directly from Saddam. Asenior level official at Al Karamahh, alleged that in2000 Huwaysh ordered two computer designs bedone to extend the range of the al Samud, one for500 km and the other for 1000 km, which were providedhim in late 2000. Huwaysh disputes all theseaccounts.• As late as 2003, Iraq’s leadership discussed noWMD aspirations other than advancing the country’soverall scientific and engineering expertise,which potentially included dual-use research anddevelopment, according to the former Minister ofMilitary Industrialization. He recalled no discussionsamong Regime members about how to preserveWMD expertise per se, but he observed therewere clear efforts to maintain knowledge and skillsin the nuclear field.Pumping Up Key Revenue StreamsBaghdad made little overall progress in lifting sanctionsbetween December 1998 and November 2002,despite Russia’s pressure to include language inUNSCR 1284 that provided for the end of sanctions.The former Regime, however, was able to increaserevenue substantially from several legitimate andillicit sources. Iraq started to receive the revenues ofOFF in January 1997. Revenues from this programincreased from $4.2 billion in 1997 to a peak of$17.87 billion in 2000 (see the Regime Finance andProcurement chapter).• According to his former science advisor, ‘AmirHamudi Hasan Al Sa’adi, Saddam, by mid-to-late2002, had concluded that sanctions had erodedto the point that it was inevitable they would bedropped.60