Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Syria’s two primary transportation companies, SESInternational (previously known as Lama TradingCompany) run by its General Manager, Asif Al-Shalish,and the Nurallah Transportation Company, hadsignificant ties to the Iraqi MIC.Amman airport was also used as an air transshipmentpoint. An Iraqi businessman declared that, a Jordaniancompany procuring illicit goods on behalf ofIraq shipped prohibited goods to Amman airport foronward transfer to Iraq.Smuggling by AirA former Iraqi diplomat described how several timesper month Iraqi diplomatic personnel would smugglelarge quantities of money and prohibited equipmentfrom Russia to Iraq. From 2001 until the fallof Baghdad, goods were smuggled out of Russia byIraqi Embassy personnel. Equipment smuggled bythis method included high-technology items such asradar jammers, GPS jammers, night-vision devices,avionics, and missile components of various types.A charter flight flew from Moscow to Baghdad everyMonday, with a return flight on Wednesday. The flightwas not inspected by the UN and was used to smugglecash and other goods, which Iraq was not allowedto procure under UN sanctions, into Baghdad. Cashand equipment were smuggled two or three times amonth by diplomatic courier, usually disguised asdiplomatic mail. Bribes were paid to Russian customsofficials to facilitate these illicit shipments.• A former Iraqi MFA employee who worked as adiplomatic courier and had direct access to informationreports that the Iraqi ambassador to Russiapersonally delivered GPS jammers to the IraqiEmbassy in Damascus during April 2003. Theambassador used a private jet for transport, with theGPS jammers concealed as diplomatic mail. Thejammers were transferred to Al Qaim border checkpoint.A senior executive in the MIC provided informationdetailing how direct frequent flights between Minskand Baghdad were instituted in the summer of 2000.Belarus established a joint airline with Iraq thatemployed four Boeing-747s to transfer unspecifiedillicit items, experts, and officials direct to Baghdadunder the cover of humanitarian aid missions.Smuggling by LandIraq deployed many state institutions whose missionwas to facilitate illicit trade by land. According to anIraqi customs inspector with direct access, the IIS, theSSO, and the MIC used the border checkpoint systemas a method of obtaining prohibited goods.One such Border Check Point (BCP) facility waslocated at Turaybil. The activity at that BCP wasrepresentative of the smuggling infrastructure usedto ship illicit goods into Iraq at other BCPs. Turaybilwas part of the MoTC border checkpoint system thatfacilitated the movement of a large amount of contrabandgoods into Iraq. The Iraqi customs service wasforbidden to inspect IIS shipments.• Turaybil contained an IIS office, an ILTC office, anSSO office, and a Directorate of Military Intelligenceoffice, according to information relayed byan Iraqi customs inspector with direct access. The“Orient Company” was often listed as the sender ofequipment, with Iraqi front companies, includingAl-Basha’ir, Al-Faris, Hatteem and Al-Faw, servedas the consignees. The “Orient Company” was themost common cover name for illicit IIS-assistedshipments into Iraq—the company did not exist.• The volume of traffic at the Turaybil border crossingmeant that it would not be possible to adequatelyinspect traffic entering Iraq.According to a captured document, days before OIF,the JEFF Corporation of Bulgaria offered and wasprepared to export 500 Igla MANPADS missiles,50 grip stocks, and two inspection platforms to Iraq.There is no evidence that the contract was fulfilled.The Iraqi front company named Al-Basha’ir, however,subcontracted the Nurallah Transportation Companyof Damascus to ship the embargoed goods from aLebanese port to Al-Basha’ir warehouses, and thenon to Baghdad. The goods would take a total of three138