Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Saddam’s Use of Execution—Managementby ThreatFear of Presidential violence was widespread underthe former Regime, but some situations meritedexplicit threats. The return from Jordan in February1996 of Saddam’s son-in-law, Husayn Kamil HasanAl Majid, “the traitor,” was such an event. This SSOadministrative order was found after Operation IraqiFreedom:An administrative orderThe order of the Special Security Organization DirectorThe traitor Husayn Kamil Hasan is to be treated asany citizens in the state and his, or his traitorousgroup’s orders are not to be obeyed in any way or inany location in the country. Anyone who obeys hisorders will be punished by execution, by order of theLeader, The President, God Bless Him.This order is posted by the Security Unit divisionmanager and it is timed below.Dated 20 Feb 96.Suspicion of StructuresSaddam’s Effect on the Workingsof the Iraqi GovernmentSaddam profoundly distrusted constitutional structuresbecause they risked accruing power independentof his. The legally powerful cabinet never metin later years as a deliberative body. When it didmeet—for information or ratification purposes—Saddam avoided agendas. The same occurred at RCCmeetings. Instead, when business required an agenda,such as dealing with issues requiring cross-portfoliodecisions, Saddam met Ministers individually or assub-committees. Likewise, attendees often had nopreparation for what Saddam might raise.• “Meetings of the political leadership were notscheduled . . . many times they were convenedwithout knowing the subject of the meeting. Hewould simply raise an issue . . . without warning,”according to Tariq ‘Aziz.Regime StrategicIntentPowerless StructuresIraq under Saddam had all the formal decisionmakingstructures and staff of a modern state, butthey did not make national strategic policy. Iraqpossessed a skilled foreign ministry and able technocratsin all branches of government. They could routeproposals upward in the Regime almost to its end, butnot if they conflicted with Saddam’s strategic intent orif they proposed an alternate national strategy.Iraq possessed a full array of government organsfamiliar to any “Western” country: president,national assembly, judiciary, civil service; but theiractual functions and relationship with each otherbore no resemblance to Western counterparts.Instead, they filled control or cosmetic roles in supportof Saddam’s dictatorship. They played little partin the effective chain of command under Saddam, andthey did not exercise a decision-making or executiverole comparable to nominally similar organs inWestern states.13