Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Saddam’s handling of Iraq’s response to the 9/11attacks probably reflects a lack of understanding ofUS politics and may explain why Baghdad failedto appreciate how profoundly US attitudes hadchanged following September 2001. Saddam’s poorunderstanding of US attitudes contributed to flaweddecision-making, according to Tariq ‘Aziz. Accordingto ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh,Saddam rejected advice from his cabinet to offercondolences after the attacks:• Ministers discussing the attacks recommended thatIraq should issue an official statement condemningthe terrorists and offering condolences to the peopleof the United States, despite American hostilitytoward Iraq.• Saddam refused on the grounds that he could notextend official condolences, given the hardshipsthe Iraqi people had suffered at the hands of the USGovernment—without any US apology. Saddamwas happy after the 11 September 2001 attacksbecause it hurt the United States, according to Tariq‘Aziz, and he declined to issue any statements ofcondolence.• Saddam’s response dissatisfied most ministers, whosaw the catastrophe as being beyond state-to-staterelations. They feared that official Iraqi non-reactionwould associate Baghdad with Al Qa’ida.Moreover, they perceived that the net result of theattack would align the United States against Islamand the Arabs.• Saddam dismissed these concerns, but he authorizedTariq ‘Aziz to pursue a “people to people”program by privately expressing condolences individuallyto a few US officials.• Iraq’s media was unique among Middle Easternservices in praising the attackers, according to theForeign Broadcast Information Service.Former Iraqi officials concluded, time and timeagain, that the threat inherent in their WMD arsenaland weapons delivery systems helped preserveSaddam’s Regime.• In April 1990, Saddam threatened “by God, we willmake fire eat up half of Israel, if it tried [to strike]against Iraq.” Saddam’s statement was part of alengthy speech in which he denied having a nuclearweapons program. His warning might have beenmeant to deter Israel from preemptively attackingan industrial facility, which manufactured electricalcapacitors alleged to be used in the trigger ofa nuclear device, as it had done when it struck theOsirak reactor in June 1981.• Prior to Desert Storm, Saddam threatened to usemissile- and aircraft-delivered chemical and biologicalmunitions to deter Israel and the coalition fromattacking Iraq or at worst unseating the Regime.Former Iraqi officials concluded the threat inherentin their WMD arsenal and delivery systems helpedpreserve the Regime when Coalition Forces did notinvade Baghdad in 1991.• Saddam’s public and private statements in 1990and 1991 reveal that Iraq envisioned using WMDagainst Israel and invading Coalition Forcesunder certain conditions. Iraq later declared toUNMOVIC inspectors that just prior to the Gulfwar it dispersed CBW munitions to selected airfieldsand other locations. This included 75 “specialwarheads” for the Al Husayn missile deployed atfour sites, with the warheads and missile bodiesstored separately. Iraq told UNMOVIC these weaponswere only to be used in response to a nuclearattack on Baghdad, and that the government haddelegated retaliatory authority to field commanders.(See “Excerpts from a Closed Door Meeting” insetbelow for additional information).• Public statements, intensified research and development,production, weaponization, and dispersalof WMD suggest that Saddam sought the optionof using WMD strategically before and duringDesert Storm. He hoped to prolong the war withthe United States, expecting that the US populationwould grow war-weary and stop the attack.• Saddam announced on the eve of the ground campaignthat the Al Husayn missile was “capable ofcarrying nuclear, chemical and biological warheads.”He warned that Iraq “will use weaponsRegime StrategicIntent33